A Failure of the Fourth Amendment & Equal Protection\u27s Promise: How the Equal Protection Clause Can Change Discriminatory Stop and Frisk Policies by Starkey, Brando Simeo
Michigan Journal of Race and Law 
Volume 18
2012 
A Failure of the Fourth Amendment & Equal Protection's Promise: 
How the Equal Protection Clause Can Change Discriminatory Stop 
and Frisk Policies 
Brando Simeo Starkey 
Villanova University School of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjrl 
 Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, Criminal Law Commons, Fourth Amendment 
Commons, Law and Race Commons, and the Law Enforcement and Corrections Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Brando S. Starkey, A Failure of the Fourth Amendment & Equal Protection's Promise: How the Equal 
Protection Clause Can Change Discriminatory Stop and Frisk Policies, 18 MICH. J. RACE & L. 131 (2012). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjrl/vol18/iss1/3 
 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at University of Michigan Law School 
Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Journal of Race and Law by an authorized 
editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
A FAILURE OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT & EQUAL
PROTECTION'S PROMISE: HOW THE EQUAL
PROTECTION CLAUSE CAN CHANGE
DISCRIMINATORY STOP AND FRISK POLICIES
Brando Sirneo Starkey*
INTRODUCTION........................ .......... 134
I. A FAILURE OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT...... ............... 139
A. Stop and Frisk, the Nine Black Robes, and
the Lower Courts..............................140
B. Floyd and Stop and Frisk in NewYork City ................... 145
II. MAKING THE CASE(S) ....................................... 149
A. The Intent Doctrine: How Bad Is It?....... .......... 150
1. Proving That Which Cannot Be Proved............. 150
2. Unconscious Bias and Equal Protection .............. 154
B. The Case for Change... ......................... 160
III. THE PROFFERED SOLUTIONs. .................................. 166
A. Professor Theodore Eisenberg and the
"Causation Principle". ...................... ..... 167
B. Professor Charles Lawrence and the Cultural Meaning Test..... 170
C. Professor Derek Black and Deliberate Indiference...............174
D. United States v. City of New York and
Historical Deliberate Indiference............... ...... 175
* Visiting Assistant Professor, Villanova University School of Law. Harvard Law
School, J.D., 2008; The Ohio State University, B.A., 2004.
I would like to thank those who commented on a draft of this paper at the Mid-
Atlantic People of Color Legal Scholarship Conference at Howard University School of
Law. I would also like to extend my appreciation to the faculty ofVillanova Law School
where I presented an earlier version of this paper, and the same applies to the law faculty
of Chicago-Kent. Additionally, I would like to thank Kim Forde-Mazrui, Philip Hamburg-
er, Todd Aagaard, Penny Pether, David Caudill, and Louis Sirico for their advice regarding
the paper. Finally, I am grateful for my research assistants Erika Bayon and Meghan J. Tal-
bot for their invaluable assistance.
Additionally, I'd like to extend a thank you to the Equal Justice Society, my former
employer, and especially to Eva Paterson, who taught me much about the Intent Doctrine.
Last but not least, I'd like to thank my mother, father, brother, and fianc6e Wendy
Ferguson.
This article is part of a manuscript that I am currently writing entitled The Intent
Doctrine. My other previous works, Brando Simeo Starkey, Criminal Procedurejury Discrimi-
nation & the Pre-Davis Intent Doctrine: The Seeds of a Weak Equal Protection Clause, 38 Am. J.
CanM. L. 1 (2010) (arguing that the Intent Doctrine started with Smith v. Mississippi, not
Washington v. Davis) [hereinafter Starkey, Criminal Procedure] and Brando Simeo Starkey,
Inconsistent Originalisn and the Need for Equal Protection Re-Invigoration, 4 GEo.J.L. & MOD.
CRIT. RACE PERSP. 1 [hereinafter Starkey, Inconsistent Originalism] (arguing that the future
of the Equal Protection Clause must not hinge on the ratifying generation's original un-
derstanding of equal protection), will also be included in this forthcoming manuscript.
131
132 Michigan journal of Race & Law [VOL. 18:131
IV NEW SOLUTION: PLAINTIFF-BURDENED
DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE ................................... 179
A. Unraveling Plaintif- Burdened Deliberate Indiference..........179
B. Possible Criticisms..........................181
V. APPLICATION ................................................ 182
A. Alerting the State ........................ ...... 183
B. Presenting New York City with an Alternate Policy ............ 183
1. Officer Tracking. .................... ..... 183
2. Center for Constitutional
Rights' Recommendations .................. 184
3. Anti-Racial Profiling Laws.............. ....... 185
4. Quota System..... ....................... 185
C. Failure to Act ...................................... 186
D. Compelling Reasons Not to Act .............. ..... 186
CONCLUSION .............................. .......... 187
In August of 2006, Nicholas K. Peart, a young, Black New Yorker,
was sitting on a Manhattan bench with his cousin and a friend, celebrat-
ing his eighteenth birthday.' As they were conversing and enjoying their
evening, squad cars suddenly encircled them.2 "Get on the ground," hol-
lered an officer from a window of a marked police vehicle. With multiple
guns pointed at their heads, one officer reached into Peart's pockets and
pulled out his photo identification.' "Happy birthday," the cop sarcastically
remarked.! After asking Peart and his companions a few questions, the
cops bid their adieus and left the young men lying on the sidewalk.6
Not even two years later, in the spring of 2008, Peart was stopped
and frisked again, this time after leaving his grandmother's Flatbush,
Brooklyn, residence. As he strolled down the street to a nearby bus stop,
an unmarked police car passed him and then backed up.8 Three cops
quickly jumped out and ordered him to put his hands against a garage
door.9 They snatched his wallet out of his pocket and looked at his identi-
fication; Peart was then let go.1o
1. See Nicholas L. Peart, Why Is the N YRD. After Me?, N.Y TIMES, Dec. 18, 2011,
at 6.
2. See id.
3. Id.
4. See id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
The Equal Protection Clause
In September 2010, it happened again." He was stopped, frisked,
searched, identified, and then left alone.12
In May 2011, Peart was leaving his apartment building on his way to
a local store when two officers hopped out of an unmarked car and di-
rected him to stop and put his hands against a wall." Peart, now
unfortunately accustomed to following the dictates of those wearing the
shield, did as he was commanded. 4 One officer grabbed Peart's cell phone
from his hand and another reached into his pockets and removed his wal-
let and keys.'" The officer rummaged through his wallet and handcuffed
him. One cop then asked which one of the keys opened his apartment
door.1 7 Next, the cop entered his building and tried to enter his apart-
ment." A different police officer, meanwhile, put the handcuffed Peart in
the back of a police car.' 9 That officer asked Peart whether he had any
marijuana.20 Peart responded, "No."21 The officer then removed and
searched his shoes and patted down his socks.22 Peart drew the officers'
attention because they said he supposedly fit the description of someone
who had been ringing a neighbor's doorbell. When the officer who had
taken Peart's keys returned, the handcuffs were removed; the officers told
Peart to get out of the police car and drove off.2 4
Given all of the police attention he has drawn, one might presume
that Peart is a dangerous, hardened criminal with a long rap sheet. He
isn't. Peart is just a twenty-three year old college student, who, due to the
color of his skin, looks like a criminal.25
11. See id.
12. Id.
13. See id.
14. See id.
15. Id.
16. See id.
17. See id.
18. See id.
19. See id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. See id.
24. Id.
25. See id. See generally Tracey Maclin, "Black and Blue Encounters"-Some Preliminary
Thoughts About Fourth Amendment Seizures: Should Race Matter?, 26 VAL. U. L. REv. 243,
250-53 (1991) (providing additional stories of racial profiling).
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INTRODUCTION
Terry v. Ohio changed everything. Before Terry, Fourth Amendment
law was settled. 7 The Fourth Amendment had long required that police
officers have probable cause in order to conduct Fourth Amendment in-
vasions;28 to administer a "reasonable" search and seizure, the state needed
probable cause. 29 But in 1968, the Warren Court, despite its liberal reputa-
tion,"' lowered the standard police officers had to meet to conduct a
certain type of search: the so-called " 'stop' and 'frisk.' " A "stop and frisk"
26. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
27. Scott E. Sundby writes: "Prior to Camara, Fourth Amendment analysis had a
relatively high amount of predictability: the Court presumed that a warrant based on
probable cause was required before the police could perform a search or arrest." Scott E.
Sundby, A Return to Fourth Amendment Basics: Undoing the Mischief of Camara and Terry, 72
MINN. L. REV. 383, 386 (1988) (citing Agnello v. U.S., 289 U.S. 20 (1925)). Sundby argues
that the Supreme Court intimated that a warrantless search was a Fourth Amendment
violation by definition. Id.
To portray the police tactics featured in Terry as unusual for the time would be his-
torically inaccurate. Police departments had used stop and frisk techniques against suspects
before Terry ever reached the Supreme Court in 1968. Some states even had their legisla-
tures codify stop and frisk policies. See Wayne R. LaFave, "Street Encounters" and the
Constitution, Terry, Sibron, Peters and Beyond, 67 MICH. L. REV. 39, 40 n.4, 42 (1968) (not-
ing that stop and frisk was not a new police tactic in the late 1960s); see also Jerome H.
Skolnick, Racial Profiling-Then and Now, 6 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL'y 65, 65 (2007)
(pointing out that police in the South had long functioned as a tool to enforce Jim Crow).
28. See David A. Harris, Particularized Suspicion, Categorical judgments: Supreme Court
Rhetoric Versus Lower Court Reality Under Terry v. Ohio, 72 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 975, 975
(1998).
29. Perhaps the best example of the argument that the Terry Court reversed prece-
dent is Justice Douglas's dissent in Terry. Douglas writes that "[t]he infringement on
personal liberty of any 'seizure' of a person can be 'reasonable' under the Fourth Amend-
ment if we require the police to possess 'probable cause' before they seize him." Terry, 392
U.S. at 38 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Not all agree, however, that the Court erred in holding
that some searches did not require probable cause. See Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment
First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 761 (1994) (arguing that the words of the Fourth
Amendment "do not require probable cause for all searches and seizures without war-
rants."); see also Akhil Reed Amar, Terry and Fourth Amendment First Principles, 1097 ST.
JOHN'S L. REv. 1097, 1097 (1998) (arguing that "the good Terry" allowed for some searches
without probable cause).
30. See MORTON J. HoRwITZ, THE WARREN COURT AND THE PURSUIT OF JUSTICE 3
(1998) (arguing that the Warren Court extended freedoms and rights to persons long de-
nied them).The Warren Court is historically remembered as a liberal era of constitutional
interpretation. Brown v. Board of Education 347 U.S. 483 (1954), was undoubtedly its most
historically memorable decision, but the Warren Court's reputation as a liberal Court is
owed to other cases such as Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). However, as Tracey
Maclin writes, it is ironic "that the police power to 'frisk' suspicious persons is the product
of a Supreme Court that did more to promote the legal rights of [B]lack Americans than
any other court." Tracey Macin, Terry v. Ohio's Fourth Amendment Legacy: Black Men and
Police Discretion, 72 ST.JOHN's L. REv. 1271, 1275 (1998).
31. Terry, 392 US. at 16.
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occurs when a police officer, believing a suspect is armed and crime is
afoot, stops the suspect, conducts an interrogation, and pats him down for
weapons.3 2 In Terry, the Supreme Court detached reasonableness from
probable cause for such "limited" searches and seizures; if a police officer's
suspicions, based on articulable facts, lead her to believe that crime is
afoot and that a perpetrator is armed, then under the Fourth Amendment,
a search for weapons is constitutionally permissible.3 Despite reversing
precedent,34 Terry and its Supreme Court progeny allowed police officers
to rely upon their reasonable suspicions to conduct searches only under
narrow conditions. Lower courts, however, have enlarged Terry beyond
recognition. Indeed, police officers now have wide latitude to stop and
frisk suspects.
As the trajectory of American race relations predicts, minorities, par-
ticularly males in lower-income communities, have complained of police
harassment in the wake of Terry.36 Indeed, Blacks and Hispanics contend
that police officers stop and frisk them even when no "reasonable" basis
for doing so exists. It seems that "reasonableness" highly correlates to mel-
1 37
anin.
The practice is particularly troubling in the nation's most populous
city. In 2011 alone, New York police officers made over 680,000 stops.
87 percent of those stopped were Black and Hispanic, despite constituting
only slightly more than half of the city's population.3 9 The practice is not
even particularly effective. For instance, in eight-square blocks of a low-
income Brooklyn neighborhood, from January 2006 to March 2010,
NYPD officers made nearly 52,000 stops.40 Yet, less than 1 percent of
those stops resulted in an arrest, and the police recovered a paltry twenty-
five guns." Such aggressive policing tactics targeted largely at Black men
have correlated with their extraordinarily high incarceration rates,42
32. Stephen M. Raphael, "Stop and Frisk" in a Nutshell: Some Last Editorial Thrusts
and Parries Before It All Becomes History, 20 ALA. L. REv. 294,294 (1968).
33. Terry, 392 U.S. at 30-31.
34. Id. at 36 (Douglas,J., dissenting).
35. See discussion infra Part A.
36. See David A. Harris, Factors for Reasonable Suspicion: When Black and Poor Means
Stopped and Frisked, 69 IND. L.J. 659, 680-81 (1994).
37. See Peart, supra note 1, at 6.
38. SeeJohn Doyle & Rocco Parascandola, 'Stop-&-Frisks' Soar to Record, N.Y. DAILY
NEWS, Feb. 15, 2012, at 10.
39. See id.; see also Editorial, The Truth Behind Stop-and-Frisk, NYTIMES, Sep. 3, 2011,
at A20.
40. See Ray Rivera, Al Baker & Janet Roberts, A Few Blocks, 4 Years, 52,000 Police
Stops, N.Y TIMES,Jul. 12, 2010, at Al.
41. See id. at A17.
42. In 2008, 3,161 of every 100,000 Blacks were imprisoned. WILLIAM J. SABOL,
HEATHER C. WEST & MATTHEW COOPER, BUREAu OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, BuREAu OF JUSTICE
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leading many to conclude that the criminal justice system is the new Jim
Crow. 3
From the New York stop and frisk numbers flows the class-action
Floyd v. City of New York.4 In Floyd, minority plaintiffs contend that the
city's stop and frisk practices unconstitutionally infringe upon personal
45liberty. The Fourth Amendment as currently interpreted, however, per-
mits cities like New York to promulgate stop and frisk practices that result
in racial harassment. What constitutional tool, then, can compel local
governments and police departments to revamp their discriminatory stop
and frisk techniques?
The answer must be the Equal Protection Clause.The Equal Protec-
tion Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, however, has been shredded.
With the maintenance of the Intent Doctrine, which requires a claimant
to trace a purported equal protection deprivation back to a discriminato-
ry motive, the Supreme Court has nearly nullified a clause that reads as a
guarantee of legal equality.47 The work of the 39th Congress has been an-
nulled. Only tattered remains survive.48 The Equal Protection Clause,
however, can be pieced back together, as this Article demonstrates. Those
words, "no state shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
STATIsTICs BULLETIN: PRISONERS IN 2008 at 2 tbl.2 (2009), available at http://
bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/p08.pdf.
43. The most notable example of this thesis is Michelle Alexander's oft-extolled
book. See generally MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN
THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (2010). Not all agree with the Jim Crow analogy. See James
Forman Jr., Racial Critiques of Mass Incarceration: Beyond tile New jirn Crow, 87 N.Y U. L.
REv. 21, 22-23 (2012) (arguing that the Jim Crow analogy is unhelpful).
44. 813 E Supp. 2d 457, 458 (S.D.N.Y 2011).
45. See id.
46. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996). Justice Scalia writes: "We
of course agree with petitioners that the Constitution prohibits selective enforcement of
the law based on considerations such as race. But the constitutional basis for objecting to
intentionally discriminatory application of laws is the Equal Protection Clause, not the
Fourth Amendment." Id.
47. The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1873), likewise nullified the Fourteenth
Amendment's Privilege and Immunities Clause.
48. It is tattered for racial minorities, that is. The Equal Protection Clause works
very well at protecting Whites from supposed claims of reverse discrimination. Derrick
Bell, who concurs, writes:
We in modern America for some years now have been witnessing the shift
of the Court's racial shield from minorities to [WI]hites. In other words, the
presumption-despite staggering evidence-seenis now to be that nondis-
crimmnation is the norm and that, in the absence of strong proof of fairly
blatant discriminatory intent, the equal protection shield now protects both
[Whites in general and individual [W]hites who allege disadvantage by the
operation of racial remediation plans.
DERRICK A. BELL, RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW 185 (6th ed. 2008).
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equal protection of the laws,"49 adopted in 1868, though now functionally
dead for people of color, can be resuscitated if the highest Court is so in-
clined.so
Some in the legal community-practitionersjudges, and law profes-
sors-are eager to supplant the Intent Doctrine.5 ' Criticizing, however, is
easy. Devising a solution, on the other hand, is drastically more difficult.
Realizing that the Court's equal protection decisions have made it nearly
pointless for racial minoritieS5 to take their grievances to court, the legal
sphere has responded by proffering various replacements for the Intent
Doctrine. But has anyone proffered the right solution?
This Article argues "no" and presents a moderate fix for equal pro-
tection jurisprudence: Plaintiff-Burdened Deliberate Indifference (PBDI).
Under PBDI, the plaintiff carries the burden of proving that (1) the plain-
tiff alerted the state to the existence of a law, policy, or manner of
conducting business that constrains races unequally; (2) the plaintiff pro-
vided the governmental body with an alternative law, policy, or manner of
conducting business that is likely to greatly diminish or solve the com-
plained of racial disparities; and (3) the government failed to act. After
these three prongs are proven, (4) the government carries the burden of
proving that its failure to act furthered a compelling governmental inter-
est. If the government fails to produce a compelling governmental
interest, equal protection has been denied.
This Article does not, to be clear, call for a complete dismantling of
the Intent Doctrine. Intent can stay. Its death grip, rather, needs to be
loosened, and the Intent Doctrine must be buttressed by another means of
proving an equal protection violation. There should be, in other words,
two different ways of establishing any equal protection deprivation: intent
and Plaintiff-Burdened Deliberate Indifference.
To show how PBDI will produce transformational change for racial
minorities generally, this Article examines how it would operate in one
important context: discriminatory Terry stops. Under PBDI, racial minori-
ties can enter a courtroom armed with an equal protection argument and
leave with the stereotypically rogue police department having to change
its stop and frisk tactics. In full, this Article argues that the Equal Protec-
tion Clause should force police departments to ensure that their stop and
frisk policies, in operation, do not discriminate on the basis of race and
49. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, 5 1.
50. I concede that the presently constructed Roberts Court is not so inclined. Per-
haps future Courts will be of a different mind.
51. See, e.g., Intent Doctrine, EQUAL JUsTiCE Socmwry, http://www.equaljusticesociety.
org/law/intentdoctrine/ (last visited Oct. 4, 2012) (bringing together lawyers, academics,
researchers, and other legal minds in an effort to overturn Washington v Davis, 426 U.S.
229 (1976), and promote racial justice).
52. The Intent Doctrine also harms women. See Pers. Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442
U.S. 256 (1979).
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the best way to get there is to embrace Plaintiff-Burdened Deliberate In-
difference instead of other existing equal protection fixes.
This Article proceeds as follows: Part I argues that Fourth Amend-
ment jurisprudence has failed to restrain racially discriminatory Terry
stops. After pinpointing that constitutional vacuum, Part II makes the case
that the Equal Protection Clause should fill the void and force police
departments to ensure that their policies and officers' conduct are not ra-
cially discriminatory in operation. Part III surveys the landscape and
analyzes a few proffered solutions to the Intent Doctrine. These solutions
are critically examined and found to be fatally flawed. Most fail to provide
the result this Article seeks to achieve: requiring police departments to
take necessary steps to ensure that their officers are not conducting Terry
stops in a discriminatory manner. Another is unacceptable because it is
tantamount to a disparate impact test which the Court has already re-
buffed. Part IV fleshes out Plaintiff-Burdened Deliberate Indifference and
features a defense of it. PBDI survives rigorous inspection. Part V features
an application of PBDI to the Floyd class action. If the Supreme Court
declared that claimants could prove an equal protection violation through
PBDI, police departments and local governments would be forced to
change their policies.
Before proceeding, it's necessary to define this Article's parameters.
Its central goal is to explore the possibilities of using the Equal Protection
Clause to force local governments and police departments to change the
way they police their streets.5 3 There is the obvious issue of, say, a Latino,
believing that he has been targeted for racial reasons, who seeks to pursue
an individual remedy whether it may be exclusion of evidence in a crim-
inal prosecution or a § 1983 lawsuit. While these are important inquiries,
such individual remedies are not the concern of this article. As Professor
George C. Thomas III argues, individual remedies are not the best way to
stop racial profiling." People of color, instead, need to focus on police
departments. 5 This Article's focus, therefore, is on how minority commu-
nities might use equal protection jurisprudence as a tool to stop
discriminatory stop and frisk tactics. How can Blacks and Hispanics, as a
class, employ the Equal Protection Clause to halt the abuses in New York
53. Driving while Black is a related concept, but my article only concerns walking
while Black and Brown. See New Jersey v. Soto, 734 A.2d 350, 356 (1996) (using statistics
to support a charge of discriminatory law enforcement in driving while Black cases).
54. George C. Thomas III, Blinded by the Light: How to Deter Racial Profiling-
77hinking About Remedies, 3 RUTGERS RACE & L. REv. 39, 39 (2001).
55. Id. Some do not believe that minority communities should focus intently on
claims of racial profiling. Stanford Law Professor R. Richard Banks, for instance, "con-
clude[s] that policymakers should abandon efforts to ferret out and eliminate racial
profiling in drug interdiction." R. Richard Banks, Beyond Profiling: Race, Policing, and the
Drug War, 56 STAN. L. REv. 571, 572 (2003).
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City, for instance, that Mr. Peart and others experience all too often? That
is the question this Article seeks to answer.
This Article contributes to both equal protection and criminal pro-
cedure literatures. Undoubtedly its biggest contribution to equal
protection scholarship is the argument that claimants should be permitted
to prove an equal protection violation through Plaintiff-Burdened Delib-
erate Indifference. If PBDI is adopted, the Equal Protection Clause
suddenly becomes relevant again for racial minorities. As this Article will
detail, existing solutions are imperfect, and thus, a promising equal protec-
tion fix is sorely needed. Also important is that equal protection scholars
studying other groups, particularly women and members of the LGBT
community, might consider PBDI and find that it helps those communi-
ties in securing equality as well. But beyond proffering a new standard,
this Article takes up Professor Samuel R. Bagenstos on his call for scholars
to forge a new normative understanding of antidiscrimination law, one
that responds to our deeper scientific understanding of discrimination in
the twenty-first century.
From a criminal procedure perspective, this Article directly con-
fronts Justice Scalia's unanimous opinion in Whren v. United States.5 7 Justice
Scalia wrote that racially discriminatory criminal law enforcement violates
the Equal Protection Clause though he knows, or should know, that the
odds of such a claim being proved under the Intent Doctrine are minus-
cule." This Article offers a standard"' that might enable some to prove, as
was charged in United States v. Armstrong, that criminal law officials are
carrying out their duties in a discriminatory fashion.o
I. A FAILURE OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
The Fourth Amendment, as it stands now, fails to prevent racial mi-
norities from being disproportionately stopped and frisked on American
streets, whether reasonable suspicion exists or not. In short, Fourth
56. Samuel R. Bagenstos, Implicit Bias, "Science," and Antidiscrinination Law, 1 HARv. L.
& POLY REv. 477, 490-93 (2007).
57. 517 U.S. 806 (1996).
58. Id. at 813. Akhil Amar believes that the Terry Court should have taken note of
the equality principle which would have defined reasonableness differently thereby ex-
tending the guarantee of being free from discrimination. Amar, supra note 29, at 805-10.
59. Some contend that the Fourth Amendment should handle claims of racial pro-
filing. Tracey Maclin, along those lines, argues that the Supreme Court must not separate
race from its Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. See Tracey Maclin, Race and the Fourth
Amendment, 51 VAND. L. REv. 331,375 (1998).
60. See 517 U.S. 456 (1996) (concerning a criminal defendant alleging that he was
being prosecuted along racial lines).
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Amendment rights are being denied on the basis of race.6 ' This is a failure
of the Fourth Amendment. This Part unpacks exactly what that failure
entails.
A. Stop and Frisk, the Nine Black Robes, and the Lower Courts
At 2:30 p.m. on October 31, 1963, Detective Martin McFadden, in
plain clothes, was patrolling a street in downtown Cleveland when he saw
two Black men-Richard Chilton and John Terry-standing on a street
corner.62 The latter would have his last name become synonymous with a
controversial police tactic.3 A policeman for nearly four decades, McFad-
den was unable to articulate what specifically drew his attention to the
gentlemen. But to the officer, "they didn't look right to [him] at the
time.',6 5 With the two men having secured his interest, McFadden stood a
66few hundred feet away and watched. He peered as Terry walked down
the street, looked into a store window, and walked back to Chilton to
confer.6 ' Each man alternately repeated this action five or six times.66 A
third gentleman, Carl Katz, who was White, approached the two.6 9 A brief
conversation took place between the three with Katz walking away short-
61. There has been a wealth of literature that detailing the intersection of the
Fourth Amendment and Race. See, e.g., 1. Bennett Capers, Rethinking the Fourth Amend-
ment: Race, Citizenship, and the Equality Principle, 46 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (2011);
Devon W Carbado, (E)Racin2 the Fourth Amendment, 100 MICH. L. REV. 946 (2002); David
A. Harris, Using Race or Ethnicity as a Factor in Assessing the Reasonableness of Fourth Amend-
mentActivity: Description, Yes; Prediction, No,73 Miss. L.J. 423 (2004); Kevin R.Johnson, The
Case Against Race Profiling in Immigration Enforcement, 78 WASH. U. L.Q. 675 (2000); Amy D.
Ronner, Fleeing While Black: The Fourth Amendment Apartheid, 32 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L.
REV. 383 (2001); Adina Schwartz, 'Just Take Away Their Guns":The Hidden Racism of Terry
v. Ohio, 23 FoRDHAM URB. L.J. 317 (1996); David A. Sklansky, Traffic Stops, Minority Motor-
ists, and the Future of the Fourth Amendment, 1997 Sup. CT. REV. 271 (1997); Anthony C.
Thompson, Stopping the Usual Suspects: Race and the Fourth Amendment, 74 N.YU. L. REV.
956 (1999); Jack B. Weinstein & Mae C. Quinn,Terry, Race, andJudicial Integrity: The Court
and Suppression during the War on Drugs, 72 ST.JOHN's L. REV. 1323 (1998).
62. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 5 (1968). Terry's lawyer actually wrote a law re-
view article about his representation of John Terry. See Honorable Louis Stokes,
Representing John WTerry, 72 ST.JOHN's L. REv 727 (1998).
63. See Reuben M. Payne, The Prosecutor's Perspective on Terry: Detective McFadden
Had a Right to Protect Himself, 72 ST.JOHN'S L. REV. 733 (1998) (writing from the prosecu-
tor's prospective about the officer's actions in Terry).
64. Terry, 392 U.S. at 5.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 5-6.
67. Id. at 6.
68. Id.
69. Id.
[VOL. 18:131140
The Equal Protection Clause
ly thereafter.o A few minutes later, Chilton and Terry also departed, fol-
lowing the path that Katz had previously taken.'
Officer McFadden, after having watched the three, was suspicious.72
Believing that he had witnessed the planning of a robbery, he felt that as a
police officer, he had a duty to investigate. And so he did. McFadden
approached the three men, identified himself as a police officer, and asked
for their names.7 ' After they "mumbled something" in response, he patted
down each suspect. Upon feeling what he thought to be weapons as he
patted the outside of their clothing, McFadden removed guns from the
persons of both Terry and Chilton.
During his trial for carrying a concealed weapon, Terry sought to
have the gun excluded; he argued that it had been seized in violation of
the Fourth Amendment. The trial judge, however, admitted the firearm.
The Ohio appeals court affirmed;7 9 the Ohio Supreme Court, next, dis-
missed Terry's appeal; and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
The Court determined that Terry was "searched" and "seized" under
the Fourth Amendment.82 The Court noted, though, that these types of
searches and seizures were limited and brief and balanced those facts with
the need for law enforcement officials to combat crime and protect their
own safety and that of the public."' Even though the Fourth Amendment
was implicated, a stop and frisk was constitutionally permissible when a
police officer had reasonable suspicion that a suspect was armed and that
crime was afoot." Though needing less evidence than probable cause, po-
lice officers needed more than an "unparticularized suspicion or 'hunch'"
to conduct a valid Terry stop.85 Officers had to have, based on observation
and experience, an articulable rationale to stop and frisk a suspect. Such
searches would be governed by this question: "[W]ould the facts available
to the officer at the moment of the seizure or the search 'warrant a man
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 6-7.
75. Id. at 7.
76. Id. Katz was unarmed.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 7-8.
79. State v.Terry, 214 N.E.2d 114,122 (Oh. Ct.App. 1966).
80. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 8.
81. Terry v. Ohio, 387 U.S. 929 (1967) (granting certiorari).
82. Terry, 392 U.S. at 19.
83. Id. at 27.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
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of reasonable caution in the belief' that the action taken was appropri-
ate?", 7
The Court viewed stop and frisk as featuring two separate legal
issues." First, regarding the stop, the Court asserted that it must be reason-
able at its inception.89 But, lamentably, the Justices failed to provide the
necessary guidance to lower courts and law enforcement officials on what
exactly constituted a reasonable stop. Second, once a valid stop has oc-
curred, the focus then turns to whether the police officer may conduct a
search.90 The Court, on this point, was decidedly more enlightening. A
police officer may conduct a frisk when the officer, based on observation
and experience, believes that criminal behavior is afoot by an armed sus-
pect.91 Police are only permitted to frisk for weapons, not evidence of a
crime.92 Thus, frisks are limited to a pat down of outer clothing." As for
McFadden, the Court concluded that his stop and frisk of Terry fit per-
fectly within these bounds. 94 Without admitting its new paradigmatic shift,
the Warren Court fundamentally altered Fourth Amendment law.99 A
criminal search and seizure, for the first time, was constitutional when law
enforcement lacked probable cause.96 Reasonableness became king.
The same day that the Court handed down Terry, the Supreme
Court also decided its companion case, Sibron v. New York.97 In Sibron,
Officer Anthony Martin watched Nelson Sibron associate with known
drug users in Brooklyn." Suspecting him of selling drugs, Martin con-
fronted Sibron in a restaurant and directed him outside.99 Once the two
were outside, Martin declared, "You know what I am after.""' Sibron
mumbled something and then reached into his pocket.10 ' Martin simulta-
87. Id. at 21-22.
88. Id. at 19-20.
89. Id. at 20-21.
90. Id.
91. See id. at 30.
92. See id. at 29.
93. See id. at 30.
94. See id. at 30-31.
95. See generally John Q. Barrett, Deciding the Stop and Frisk Cases: A Look Inside the
Supreme Court's Conference, 72 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 749 (1998) (providing a look into the
Warren Court's deliberations during Terry).
96. See id. at 823-39. To be sure, police officers conducted searches on the street
without probable cause before Terry, but when the Supreme Court announced the exclu-
sionary rule in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), police officers realized that the fruits of
their "dirty" searches could not be used against the criminal defendant in court.
97. 392 U.S. 40 (1968).
98. Id. at 47.
99. Id. at 45.
100. Id.
101. Id.
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neously reached into the pocket and pulled out packets of heroin. 2 The
Court declared the search unconstitutional.'03 Officer Martin, the Court
determined, lacked reasonable articulable suspicion based on observational
evidence that Sibron was armed.104 Sibron declared that stops and frisks are
only permissible when a police officer has reasonable suspicions that a
crime is afoot that inherently requires a weapon or when reasonable sus-
picions exists that a suspect is armed.'
Adams v. Williams was decided four years after Terry and Sibron.os
Robert Williams was convicted of illegal possession of a firearm found
during a stop and frisk.' At 2:30 a.m., in a supposedly high-crime area of
Bridgeport, Connecticut, Williams was sitting in the passenger side of a
parked car.'0a At the same time, not too far away, a conversation was taking
place where a confidential informant told Sergeant John Connolly that
Williams was seated in a nearby car with a gun and drugs in his posses-
sion.'0 9 Connolly then approached the car and instructed Williams to get
out of the vehicle." 0 Williams, instead, rolled down the car windows."' As
the windows were rolling down, Connolly blindly reached into the car
and pulled out a gun from Williams's waistband.112 The Supreme Court by
a vote of six to three held that the search and seizure, based on the in-
formant's information, were reasonable under the Fourth Amendment
and Terry."'
Ybarra v. Illinois further defined the contours of reasonableness when
executing these warrantless but limited searches and seizures."4 Police in
Ybarra entered a tavern with a warrant authorizing them to search the
bartender and the premises for evidence of drug-trafficking."' The police
102. Id.
103. Id. at 68.
104. Id. at 62-63.
105. Id. at 43-44.
106. 407 U.S. 143 (1972).
107. Id. at 144-45. Williams was also convicted of heroin possession following a
search incident to his weapons arrest. Id.
108. Id. at 144-45.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 145.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Brennan's dissent was much more convincing than the majority opinion. See id.
at 151-52 (Brennan,J., dissenting). For one, the confidential informant had never provided
information that was subsequently substantiated. Id. at 156-57. The informant's infor-
mation, moreover, concerned neither guns nor drugs. See id. at 156. More importantly,
based on the confidential informant's information, Sgt. Connolly did not have any infor-
mation to lead to a reasonable conclusion that crime was taking place which was crucial
to Terry's holding. See id. at 152.
114. See generally 444 US. 85 (1979).
115. Id. at 87-88.
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went into the tavern and declared their intentions of searching everyone
inside." 6 As an officer patted down the defendant, he felt a cigarette pack
containing objects.'17 The officer removed the pack which contained her-
oin.118 As an initial matter, the Supreme Court rejected the argument that
the warrant permitted the police to search every patron in the establish-
ment."9 More important, though, the Court insisted that Terry permitted
frisks only when a police officer has reasonable suspicion that a suspect is
armed.12 Terry does not permit officers to conduct a "generalized 'cursory
search for weapons: ,'21 In Ybarra, " [t]he initial frisk of Ybarra was simply
not supported by a reasonable belief that he was armed and presently dan-
gerous," as Terry demanded.122
The Supreme Court molded what a reasonable stop and frisk
looked like through these cases. The problem, however, is that lower fed-
eral courts and state courts have marred Terry's appearance. Terry, as it is
applied now, is unrecognizable from the standard originally articulated by
the Supreme Court. The Terry Court insisted that judges must analyze the
individual facts of each particular case to determine whether a stop and
frisk was reasonable. 123 Lower federal courts and state courts, however,
have ignored the Court's guidance. 124 Indeed,"lower courts have begun to
rely on a categorical jurisprudence-that is, an ascertainment of whether
the suspect fits into one or more overly broad categories, instead of an
examination of facts that would tell both the officer on the street and a
court deciding a suppression motion whether or not there was a reasona-
ble suspicion to believe that a particular person was involved in a crime
and armed."2 5 Though the Supreme Court's standard was that the officer
would have had to have reasonable suspicion that an armed suspect was
committing or about to commit a crime, lower courts have created situa-
tions where the police officer's search will always be held reasonable
regardless of the facts of a particular case. 126 "Thus, anyone who falls into
these categories may be frisked automatically, regardless of whether the
circumstances actually indicate a weapon may be present.,,m
116. Id. at 88.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 89.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 93.
121. Id. at 93-94.
122. Id. at 92-93 (emphasis added).
123. Thomas K. Clancy, The Role of Individualized Suspicion in Assessing the Reasonable-
ness of Searches and Seizures, 25 U. MEM. L. LEV 483, 536-37 (1994).
124. Harris, supra note 28, at 987.
125. Id. at 987.
126. See id. at 987-88.
127. Id. at 988.
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Terry and its progeny ruled that officers are always permitted to frisk
a suspect when the crime suspected to be afoot is inherently violent.128
Lower state and federal courts, however, have wrongly considered crimes
that do not require weapons to be inherently violent.'2 9 Take drug traf-
ficking for instance. Starting first with high traffic drug distributors, lower
courts have declared that even the lowest level drug sellers are likely to be
armed, and thus, capable of being frisked.o Lower courts have even found
that persons on the premise of illegal gambling establishments can be au-
tomatically frisked.1 3 ' This jurisprudence has led to increased stop and
frisks of racial minorities. As David A. Harris writes, "[t]he unfortunate
fact is that Terry and its progeny have resulted in stops and frisks of resi-
dents of inner cities-primarily poor persons, African Americans, and
Hispanic Americans-far out of proportion to their numbers, and often
without justification."132 This jurisprudence, has engendered unfortunate
realities for racial minorities-an America where it is all too common that
their Fourth Amendment rights are unconstitutionally invaded. 3 3
B. Floyd and Stop and Frisk in New York City
The Executive Director of the New York Civil Liberties Union has
commented on the shockingly high number of stop and frisks in New
York City: "'Entire neighborhoods in NYC,' remarked Donna Lieberman
in 2011, 'are turning into Constitution-free zones.' "13 In 2011 alone,
New York officers made over 680,000 stops.1' Lieberman's statement
came three years after the Center for Constitutional Rights filed an initial
complaint in Floyd v. City of New York.' 36 In Floyd, class-action minority
plaintiffs were suing both the New York Police Department (NYPD) and
128. David A. Harris, Frisking Every Suspect: The Withering of Terry, 28 U.C. DAvis L.
REv. 1, 23 (1994).
129. See id.
130. Id. at 24-27.
131. Id. at 28; see also Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 136 (2000) (offering some
support to the per se rule in some lower courts that flight plus a high crime area equals
reasonable suspicion).
132. Harris, supra note 36, at 677.
133. Jeffrey Fagan & Garth Davies, Street Stops and Broken Windows: Terry, Race, and
Disorder in New York City, 28 FoRDHAM URB. L.J. 457, 496 (2000) (examining practices in
New York City and arguing that stop and frisk strategies are more about "policing poor
people in poor places").
134. Rocco Parascandola,John Doyle, Barbara Ross, Kerry Wills & Joe Kemp, NYPD
Stopping and Frisking Record Number: NYCLU, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Nov. 30, 2011, at 16.
135. Doyle & Parascandola, supra note 38.
136. Floyd v. City of New York, No. 08 Civ. 1034, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68798, at
*1 (S.D.N.Y Sept. 9,2008). Initial Complaint, Floyd, 2008 US. Dist. LEXIS 68798 (No. 08
Civ. 1034), available at http://ccrjustice.org/files/Floyd Complaint 08.01.31.pdf.
FALL 2012] 145
Michigan journal of Race & Law
the city.'3 In addition to a Fourth Amendment claim, the complaint states
that "NYPD officers, in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, often have used, and continue to use, race
and/or national origin-not reasonable suspicion-as the determinative
factors in deciding to stop and frisk individuals."'3 8
NYPD Police Commissioner Raymond W Kelly, unsurprisingly, has
consistently denied that his officers racially profile.'3 9 When presented
with evidence establishing that minorities are disproportionately stopped,
his automatic retort is that those communities' higher crime rates explain
such disparities.140 His response, however, has been invalidated by multiple
studies. In 1999, for example, New York State investigated stop and frisk
practices in New York City, using data compiled from January of 1998 to
March of 1999.'" The devastating report states that "[w]hile higher crime
rates may explain some increase in minority 'stops' above their overall
percentage of the population, crime rates do not explain the full extent to
which 'stop' rates for minorities were elevated."142 "[E]ven when popula-
tion rates and crime rates are controlled for," the report further notes,
"minorities were 'stopped' at a higher rate in New York City than
[W]hites. Crime rates do not account for the disparity."' 3 The study, in
other words, disproved New York City's "no discrimination here" talking
point.
More inconvenient for the NYPD is Columbia Law Professor Jef-
frey Fagan's study.'44 Professor Fagan's statistical findings also support the
claim that racial bias is at play. 145 As an initial matter, the study concluded
that city's stop and frisk tactics are less likely to lead to an arrest than ran-
dom checkpoints.146 Less than 6 percent of all stops lead to an arrest,
making one wonder just how low of a bar reasonable suspicion is in the
137. Floyd v. City of NewYork, 813 F. Supp. 2d 457,458 (S.D.N.Y 2011).
138. Initial Complaint, supra note 136 at 1 3.
139. Al Baker, Police Get Added Order: Stop, Frisk and 'Explain,' N.Y. TIMES, May 1,
2009, at A20.
140. See Al Bakerjudge Declines to Dismiss Case Alleging Racial Profiling by City Police
Street Stops, N.YTIMES, Sep. 1, 2011, at A22.
141. OFFICE OF THE ATTN'Y GEN., THE NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT'S "STOP
& FRISK" PRACTICES, v (1999), available at http://www.ag.ny.gov/sites/default/files/
pdfs/bureaus/civil-rights/stp-frsk.pdf.
142. Id. at 122.
143. Id. at 135.
144. Report ofJeffrey Fagan at 2, Floyd v. City of NewYork, No. 08 Civ. 1034, 2008
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68798 (S.D.N.Y Sept. 9, 2008) (No. 08 Civ. 1034), available at http://
ccrjustice.org/files/ExpertReportjeffreyFagan.pdf.
145. See id. at 3-5.
146. CENTER FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, STOP-AND-FRISK: FAGAN REPORT Sum-
MARY 1 (2010), available at http://crjustice.org/files/Fagan%20Report%/ 20Sununary%
20Final.pdf.
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minds of NYPD officers."' On the issue of racial profiling, Professor Fa-
gan's research, like that of New York State, found "that racial composition
predicts stop patterns over and above any predictions made by crime or
other factors.""' The report also establishes, as this Article argues, "that the
NYPD has engaged in patterns of unconstitutional stops of City residents
that are more likely to affect Black and Latino citizens.""' Blacks and His-
panics, in other words, are being denied their Fourth Amendment rights
on the basis of race. Brown and Black suspects, moreover, are "treated
more harshly in instances in which police officers make the determina-
tion that a crime has occurred."5 o Indeed, "Black and Latino suspects are
more likely to be arrested rather than issued a summons when compared
to White suspects who are accused of the same crimes."'' That is, when
behavior is kept constant and race is the variable, brown or black skin is a
liability. For the NYPD and the city, Professor Fagan's report is simply
damning.
The NYPD, however, furnishes its own counter-narrative. The
NYPD hinges its non-discriminatory claims on a RAND Corporation
study that it commissioned. 5 2 The RAND report maintained that the stop
and frisk data does not support charges of racial profiling.'" Professor Fa-
gan, however, found glaring methodological errors throughout the
RAND study.'5 4 The report's findings, he wrote, "are unscientific and
clearly without merit."' 5
New York City's stop and frisk tactics are what columnist Bob Her-
bert harshly labeled "Jim Crow Policing."' On the pages of the New York
Times, Herbert recounted the story of Lalit Carson, a teaching assistant at
a Bronx charter school, who was stopped during a lunch break." More
troubling was the tale of a New York Post freelance reporter, Leonardo
Blair, who was stopped and frisked and arrested for no apparent reason
147. Id.
148. Report ofJeffrey Fagan, supra note 144, at 39.
149. Id. at 2.
150. CENTER FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, supra note 146, at 2.
151. Id.
152. See generally GREG RIDGEWAY, ANALYSIS OF RACIAL DISPARITIES IN NEW YORK
POLICE DEPARTMENT'S STOP, QUESTION, AND FRISK PRACTICES (2007), available at http://
www.rand.org/content/dan/rand/pubs/technical-reports/2007/RAND-TR534.pdf.
153. See GREG RIDGEWAY, SUMMARY OF THE RAND REPORT ON NYPD's SToP,
QUESTION, AND FRISK 3-4 (2009), available at http://www.rand.org/pubs/testimonies/
2009/RANDCT329.pdf.
154. Al Baker & Ray Rivera, Thousands of Street Stops by New York Police Were Legally
Unjustified, a Study Finds, NYTIMES, Oct. 27, 2010, at A22.
155. CENTER FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, supra note 146, at 2.
156. Bob Herbert,]ini Crow Policing, N.YTIMES, Feb. 2, 2010, at A27.
157. Id.
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other than being Black at night.'" While Blair was in a holding cell, he
overheard one officer inspecting his identification exclaim, "He's not even
from the projects," suggesting that some NYPD officers either feel it is
permissible to target low-income minorities or unconsciously assume that
all minorities are criminals from the projects.'"
Much worse is the case of Michael Daragjati, the disgraced police
officer who was charged with violating the civil rights of an unnamed
Black man.'6o Daragjati was driving an unmarked car, saw a Black man in
a Staten Island neighborhood, and chose to stop and frisk him.161 The
search produced neither weapons nor contraband." The man complained
to Daragjati about his mistreatment and asked the officer for his badge
number.1 3 Despite not having probable cause to arrest him, Daragjati
falsely accused the Black man of resisting arrest.'6 This case would have
been one among the many unfortunate yet untold police profiling tales,
but Daragjati's phones were being tapped in connection with a separate
investigation.6 6 Federal governmental officials intercepted phone calls and
text messages proving that Daragjati had lied about the man resisting
arrest. 66 During a phone conversation between him and a woman, he
disclosed that he had "fried another nigger."06 The woman laughed in
168
response.
This Article makes no claim about whether unconscious bias or
conscious discrimination should be blamed here. This Article does not
argue, that is, that police officers are overtly racist or that their actions are
the inevitable outgrowth of anti-Black and anti-Brown implicit biases. 69
Professor L. Song Richardson convincingly argues that Fourth Amend-
ment scholars have mistakenly ignored how implicit bias needs to be
158. See Christine Hauser, Post Reporter Files Lawsuit Over Frisking by Police, N.Y.
TIMES, May 8, 2008, at B5.
159. Id; see Leonardo Blair, My Crime? Just Fitting the Profile, N.Y POST, Dec. 2, 2007,
at 20 (providing Blair's firsthand account).
160. See Mosi Secret, Officer Held in Civil Rights Case after Frisking, N.Y TIMES, Oct.
17, 2011, at A21.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. See id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Blacks and Hispanics can hold negative biases about their own racial group as
well. Thus, this should not be viewed solely as a White cop/Black-or-Brown citizen prob-
lem. For instance, one study found that one in ten Black cops racially profile and support
it as a necessary tool for law enforcement. See David E. Barlow & Melissa Hickman Bar-
low, Racial Profiling: A Survey of African American Police Officers, 5 POLICE Q. 334, 350-51
(2002).
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included more in the overall racial profiling conversation.' After all, "as a
result of implicit biases," Richardson writes, "an officer might evaluate be-
haviors engaged in by individuals who appear [B]lack as suspicious even as
identical behavior by those who appear [W]hite would go unnoticed.""'
From a constitutional standpoint, however, the conscious/unconscious dis-
tinction should be irrelevant. It is, in the words ofJustice Powell, "a legalism
rooted in history rather than present reality."" 2 What matters, rather, is that
race is the reason why Fourth Amendment rights are being denied, and
there is no effective remedy under current Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendment jurisprudence.
II. MAKING THE CASE(S)
Part I showed that a Fourth Amendment failure exists. Part II argues
that the Equal Protection Clause should provide a remedy. The clause's
interpretation, however, needs to be revised to meet the unique challenge
of combating discrimination in the twenty-first century. In order to make
the claim that changes are necessary, the defects of current equal protec-
tion jurisprudence need to be catalogued. Corrective measures are
imperative.And the proper adjustments will provide minorities a constitu-
tional tool to confront Floyd-like predicaments.
But it is not enough to just outline that discriminatory intent is hard
to prove, that unconscious bias exists, and that structural racism abounds.
One must argue affirmatively as to why equal protection jurisprudence
should be responsive to these facts. Scholars, that is, need to make the case
for a new normative understanding of what it means to deny a person
I . 173equal protection.
170. L. Song Richardson, Arrest Efficiency and the Fourth Amendment, 95 MINN. L. REV.
2035, 2035-37 (2011).
171. Id. at 2039.
172. Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 218-19 (Powell, J., concurring and dis-
senting) (referring to the de jure/de facto distinction regarding segregation); see Donald
Lively, The Desegregation Legacy: Uncertain Achievement and Doctrinal Distress, 47 How. L.J.
679, 688-89 (2004).
173. It might be necessary to explain how Floyd v. City of New York, 813 F Supp. 2d
457, 458 (S.D.N.Y 2011) presents an equal protection dilemma for those who either may
be confused or balk at the very idea that this is an equal protection issue. Let's say New
York City passes a criminal statute that defines reasonable suspicion for Blacks as requiring
lesser articulable facts than it does for Whites. Blacks' equal protection rights, in such a
hypothetical, unquestionably would have been denied. By that same token, if, as I am al-
leging, NYPD officers search and frisk Blacks for behaviors for which Whites are not
being searched, that too is an Equal Protection Clause violation. In Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118
U.S. 356 (1886), the Supreme Court held in 1886 that discriminatory application of a
racially neutral law still violates equal protection.
Simply because an equal protection issue exists here, does not necessarily mean that
reconstituting equal protection doctrine is the proper way to address a problem of the
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A. The Intent Doctrine: How Bad Is It?
The Intent Doctrine presents three separate legal issues for claim-
ants, though this Article focuses on only two. 174 First, there are nearly
insurmountable evidentiary burdens associated with proving intentional
discrimination. How does one prove that another intended to discrimi-
nate on the basis of race? Second, unequal discriminatory results are
often tied to implicit bias. Americans hold negative biases about racial
minorities that negatively impact the lives of people of color in various
ways. Courts, however, have not embraced unconscious bias theory.'7 7 The
law, simply put, is behind social science.
1. Proving That Which Cannot Be Proved
The Supreme Court now requires "near-impossible proof of dis-
criminatory intent ... deal[ing] a severe blow to minority groups seeking
to challenge discriminatory state action on equal protection grounds."'7
The standard, requiring plaintiffs to prove intent to discriminate, is excep-
tionally onerous for minority plaintiffs for various reasons.
One threshold issue concerns whose intentions matter? In Personnel
Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney, the Supreme Court in was tasked
with determining whether a veteran preference in civil service hiring
violated the Equal Protection Clause because veteran status is highly cor-
related with gender.77 The preference for veterans, indeed, "operate[d]
Fourth Amendment. This is an argument that some are likely to level-that it is an error
to fix the Fourth Amendment through the Equal Protection Clause. But that would be an
unfair critique. This Article endeavors to give meaning again to the words "equal protec-
tion of the laws" in all contexts. In doing so, those being denied their Fourth Amendment
rights on the basis of race will naturally benefit.
174. The third issue is a racially neutral law that burdens racial groups unequally
though no one sincerely believes the law was instituted for racially motivated reasons.
Related to this is the idea of structural and institutional racism. See john a. powell, Structur-
al Racism: Building Upon the Insights of John Calmore, 86 N.C. L. REV. 791, 794 (2008)
(describing how structural racism impedes the cause of racial equality); see also Luke W
Cole & Caroline Farrell, Structural Racism, Structural Pollution and the Need for a New Para-
digm, 20 WASH. U.J.L. & POL'Y 265, 277 (2006) (illustrating how structural racism leads to
environmental racism); Mona Lynch, Crack Pipes and Policing: A Case Study of Institutional
Racism and Remedial Action in Cleveland, 33 L. & PoL'Y 179, 179 (2011) (arguing that insti-
tutional racism was present in policing in Cleveland, Ohio).
175. See CHARLES WALLACE COLLINS, THE FouRTEENTm AMENDMENT AND THE STATES
75-76 (1912).
176. See generally R. Richard Banks, Jennifer L. Eberhardt & Lee Ross, Discrimination
and Implicit Bias in a Racially Unequal Society, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1169 (2006).
177. See Charles Lawrence III, Unconscious Racism Revisited: Reflections on the Impact
and Origins of "The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection," 40 CONN. L. REv. 931, 940 (2008).
178. BELL, supra note 48, at 184.
179. See 442 U.S. 256, 259-60 (1979).
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overwhelmingly to the advantage of males."" Only 1.8 percent of the
veterans in Massachusetts were female."' The Feeney Court held that ab-
sent a discriminatory purpose, a facially neutral law does not violate equal
protection violation.18 2 Although the Court concluded that Massachusetts
legislature had no anti-female bias, it was clear that American military
policy had historically discriminated against women.13 This partially ex-
plained why less than 2 percent of the veteran population was female.
Thus, one could argue that the Equal Protection Clause was violated be-
cause the Massachusetts legislature incorporated or passed on the
discrimination into its veteran preference employment policy. But the
Court disagreed, writing that "the history of discrimination against wom-
en in the military is not on trial in this case."l8 4 The military's
discrimination, that is, was inconsequential.
City of Memphis . Greene further establishes that the Court delimits
the discriminatory intentions that constitutionally matter." In Greene,
Black plaintiffs sued the Memphis mayor and City Council, arguing that
their decision to close a street and erect a barrier between a White and a
Black area of the city was motivated by race. '6 White property owners'
desire to protect the safety and tranquility of their neighborhood from
"undesirable traffic" propelled the city council into action by building a
barrier at the point where Black and White communities met.' The de-
cision to close a street on traffic control grounds was the only instance of
the city ever closing a street for such considerations.' 8 There was evi-
dence, furthermore, that detailed how racial animus motivated some of
the White property owners desires to close the street.5 9 But, the Court
found that only the motives of the city mattered, not its residents.'9 o
As represented by these cases, limiting the illicit motives that will re-
ceive judicial scrutiny creates a pronounced equal protection defect. A
more salient problem, however, is that illicit motives can be hidden. A
governmental actor can always deny that racial animus played any role in
decision making. Indeed, "many laws with both a discriminatory purpose
and effect might be upheld simply because of evidentiary problems inher-
ent in requiring proof of such a purpose."
180. Id. at 256.
181. Id. at 270.
182. Id. at 276-79.
183. See id. at 278, 281.
184. Id. at 278.
185. See generally 451 U.S. 100 (1981).
186. Id. at 102.
187. Id. at 136 (MarshallJ., dissenting).
188. Id. at 100 n.10.
189. See id. at 141-42 (MarshallJ., dissenting).
190. Id. at 114 n.23.
191. ERWIN CHEMERINKSY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 788-89 (2d ed. 2005).
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An examination of the jury selection discrimination cases prior to
Norris v. Alabama,192 decided in 1935, provides the best evidence that dis-
criminatory motives are very nearly borderline impossible to prove.
Charley Smith v. Mississippi formally instituted the Intent Doctrine into
equal protection law.' 3 Charley Smith was convicted of the 1894 murder
of Wiley Nesbit by an all-White jury.1 94 Because he could not prove that
Mississippi intentionally excluded Black jurors, the Supreme Court re-
fused to allow his equal protection argument to overturn his conviction.*
Thereafter, scores of Blacks were sentenced to death by juries that were
intentionally kept all-White.19' In the years following Charley Smith, a
plethora of cases established that the Intent Doctrine hindered racial jus-
tice.'9 Black criminal defendants struggled mightily to prove that the state
generally, and jury commissioners specifically, purposefully excluded
Blacks.'" Black criminal defendants failed to provide evidence that the
state schemed against them.'99 Jury commissioners, moreover, were unlike-
ly to admit to their unconstitutional activities. 200 There is, however,
evidence of purposeful exclusion of Black jurors. In Texas, in fact, jury
commissioners in at least four cases in the early 1900s conceded that they
purposefully refused to let Blacks serve on juries, and the state's courts
found equal protection violations in each instance.20 ' Attentive onlookers,
in response, learned the obvious lesson: as long as one denies any wrong-
doing, the Court cannot possibly find it.
The Supreme Court's jurisprudence in jury discrimination cases
changed with Norris v. Alabama.20 Norris involved the Scottsboro boys,
nine Black youths convicted of raping two White women in Alabama.203
Only one, twelve-year-old Roy Wright, averted a death sentence. 204 After
the Supreme Court overturned his initial conviction and the convictions
192. 294 U.S. 587,599 (1935).
193. 162 U.S. 592 (1896). See also Starkey, Criminal Procedure, supra note *, at 21-22
(explaining court's consideration of intent doctrine and equal protection in Smith case).
194. Charley Smith, 162 U.S. 597-98.
195. Id. at 601.
196. Starkey, Criminal Procedure, supra note *, at 22-29.
197. Id. at 22-30.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 19-30.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 29; see Whitney v. Texas, 59 S.W 895 (Tex. Crim. App. 1900); see also Smith
v. Texas, 69 S.W 151 (Tex. Crim. App. 1902); Kipper v. Texas, 62 S.W 420 (Tex. Crim. App.
1901); Leach v.Texas, 62 S.W 422 (Tex. Crim.App. 1901).
202. See 294 U.S. 587, 597-98 (1935).
203. JAMES A. MILLER, REMEMBERING SCOTTSBORO: THE LEGACY OF AN INFAMOUS TRIAL
7-11 (2009).
204. JAMES R. ACKER, SCOTTSBORO AND ITS LEGACY: THE CASES THAT CHALLENGED
AMERICAN LEGAL AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 34 (2008).
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of his co-defendants due to inadequate counsel ,205 Norris was reconvicted
206
and sentenced to death. In Norris, the Supreme Court arrived at a con-
clusion different than its previous intent-based standard. 207 Black criminal
defendants no longer had to prove intent to keep juries all White.2 08 The
Court held, rather, that when a criminal defendant produces evidence that
his race has historically been non-represented on juries, then a prima facie
2019
case of equal protection deprivation has been made.
The Supreme Court pored over the Alabama jury roll with magni-
fying glasses, noticing that every Black name on the roll appeared after the
names ofWhite individuals and in different ink.2 10 It was obvious that the
state doctored the jury roll to deceive the Court into believing that Black
names were in fact there all along but that Negroes simply had not been
called to serve as jurors. Norris's lawyers contended that "these 'forgeries'
constituted an 'admission' " of purposeful exclusion.
But the Court opted not to hang their claim of equal protection
deprivation on the doctored jury roll, illustrating the problem with the
Intent Doctrine on at least two grounds. First, the Court might have con-
cluded that the doctored jury roll did not prove intentional
discrimination. If true, that underscores how difficult it is to establish in-
tentional discrimination. If the doctored jury roll was not adequate, what
exactly was? Second, the Court might have consciously chosen to craft a
holding broad enough to be applicable in a wide array of cases. A doc-
tored jury roll, one must assume, would be a highly unique piece of
evidence. If the Court would have tied intent to that evidence, Norris
would have been unhelpful in the overwhelming majority of jury dis-
crimination cases. One cannot be certain what the Justices were thinking
in the early 1930s, but an analysis of Norris establishes that the Intent
Doctrine acts as a barrier to racial progress.
Some might contend that these jury discrimination cases are irrele-
vant today. Perhaps this is why scholars generally refuse to dust them off
when analyzing equal protection jurisprudence and insist, wrongly, that
we owe the Intent Doctrine to Washington v. Davis.212 But these aged
205. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69-73 (1932).
206. F. Raymond Daniell, Scottsboro Negro Is Convicted Again, N.Y TIMES, Dec. 7, 1933,
at 16.
207. See Norris, 294 U.S. at 591-92.
208. See id. at 591.
209. Id.
210. See DAN T. CARTER, ScoTTSssoO: A TRAGEDY OF THE AMERICAN SOUTH 319
(1979); Hits Alabama Jury Book, N.Y.TIMES, Feb. 16,1935, at 2.
211. Hits Alabania jury Book, supra note 210.
212. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).These are but a few of the articles
that ignore the jury discrimination cases when discussing equal protection and intent:
Gayle Binion, Intent and Equal Protection:A Reconsideration, 1983 Sup. CT. REv 397 (1983);
Charles Lawrence 1II, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious
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decisions are terribly important even now. The Court's current concep-
tion of intent-that a claimant must prove that a specific actor was
motivated by discriminatory considerations-is the toughest standard of
intent to prove, and it was the same exact standard of intent that was em-
ployed in these early jury discrimination cases. 2 13 The current Court, that
is, employs the same strict definition of intent that the Court constructed
in the late 1800s; this is problematic since that standard is derived from a
Court that had grown tired of dealing with Negroes and their cries for
equality and "special" rights.214 The Intent Doctrine has long functioned
as a barrier to equality for people of color.215 It did in 1896 when the
Court decided Charley Smith.216 It did in 1935 when the Court created an
exception to intent in Norris.2' And it does now.
When searching for less exacting standards of intent, investigating
tort law proves very helpful. An actor is liable for an intentional tort when
he intended to perform the act that violates a legally protected interest.
Tort law, moreover, frequently presumes that tortfeasors intended the fore-
seeable consequences of their actions.21 8 A person who hits someone after
swinging a golf club in a crowded room, for instance, has committed an
intentional tort irrespective of whether the person consciously desired to
deliver the bloW.219 But the Equal Protection Clause requires the strictest
definition of intent, specific purpose: "Why should tort plaintiffs," one
Constitutional law case book inquirers, "receive more protection than
African-Americans or women?" 22 0
2. Unconscious Bias and Equal Protection
Professor Charles Lawrence's seminal piece The Id, the Ego, and Equal
Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism is the starting place when dis-
cussing unconscious bias and equal protection.2 21 In his article, Professor
Lawrence claimed that the Court wrongly conceived of facially neutral
laws as "either intentionally and unconstitutionally or unintentionally and
Racism, 39 STAN. L. REv. 317 (1987); Reva Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects:
The Evolving Forms of Status-Enforcing State Action, 49 STAN. L. REv. 1111 (1997).
213. See Starkey, Criminal Procedure, supra note * at 49.
214. SeeThe Civil Rights Cases, 105 U.S. 3,25 (1883); see also DONALD E. LiVELY,THE
CONSTITUTION AND RACE 81 (1992) (arguing that the Supreme Court in The Civil R(ghts
Cases thought that "the time for special attention had passed.").
215. See generally Starkey, supra note *.
216. See Charley Smith v. Mississippi, 162 U.S. 592 (1896).
217. See Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587, 599 (1935).
218. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs § 8A cmt. B (1965)
219. See id.
220. PAUL BREST ET. AL., PRoCESSES OF CONSTITUTIoNAL DECISIONMAKING: CASES AND
MATERIALs 1032 (5th ed. 2006).
221. See generally Lawrence, supra note 212.
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constitutionally discriminatory."222 This was, in Professor Lawrence's esti-
mation, a "false dichotomy" because many acts that burden racial
minorities are not intentional in the sense that they were purposefully
done, but not unintentional in the sense that they were "random, fortui-
tous, and uninfluenced by the decisionmaker's beliefs, desires, and
-- ,,223
wishes.
Professor Lawrence was contending that many decisions reflect an
American culture where anti-minority beliefs pervade, beliefs which lead
to negative outcomes for people of color. An actor might not consciously
intend to cause an anti-minority outcome, but it results anyway because
of the varying unconscious biases that all Americans hold by virtue of
living in this society. For this, Professor Lawrence offered two explana-
tions.The first was Freudian theory which dictates that the mind will hide
thoughts which are uncomfortable to the psyche as a defense mecha-
nism.224 American culture instructs that racism and discrimination are
unacceptable. Therefore, when the mind deals with a "conflict between
racist ideas and the societal ethic that condemns those ideas," "the mind
excludes his racism from his consciousness."225 Second, Professor Lawrence
relied upon cognitive psychology. This literature contends that culture
disseminates particular lessons that shape how we define the world, but
these lessons are not explicitly learned. 226 "Instead, they seem part of the
individual's rational ordering of her perceptions of the world."2 27 The ob-
server who believes that Blacks are lazy is unaware that the belief is the
product of years of anti-Black cultural lessons.228 This led Professor Law-
rence to conclude that "requiring proof of conscious or intentional
motivation as a prerequisite to constitutional recognition that a decision is
race-dependent ignores much of what we understand about how the hu-
man mind works." 229 To Professor Lawrence, the Intent Doctrine is at odds
with reality.
With Professor Lawrence's article serving as a launching pad, implic-
it bias scholars put Professor Lawrence's claims to the test, and proved his
230basic premise: that unconscious bias exists and explains behavior. As
222. Id. at 322.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 323.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. See, e.g., Kristin A. Lane et al., Implicit Social Cognition and Law, 3 ANN. REV. L. &
Soc. Sci. 427 (2007). It is important to note that Professor Linda Hamilton Krieger wrote
two articles relying on early psychological research. See Linda Hanilton Krieger, Content of
Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity,
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Kristin A. Lane, Jerry Kang and Mahzarin R. Banaji write, "we have in-
controvertible evidence that thoughts, feelings, and actions are shaped by
factors residing largely outside conscious awareness, control, and inten-
tion."231 People are not, contrary to common perception, "savage
rationalists [with] . . . consciousness [as] the default mental state."2 32 Hu-
man behavior, rather, is constantly the manifestation of subconscious
thoughts.233
A breakthrough for implicit bias researchers was the Implicit Associ-
ation Test (IAT), which measures unconscious attitudes. The IAT has
demonstrated that the overwhelming majority ofWhite Americans have a
persistent and automatic positive assessment of Whites but negative as-
sessment of Blacks.235 Though racism has declined in society over the
years, "research using indirect measures suggests that subtle and implicit
forms of prejudice and discrimination remain pervasive."23 6
Professor Jerry Kang details how race impacts "interpersonal inter-
actions," dubbing the process "racial mechanics."237 In Professor Kang's
own words:
Through law and culture, society provides us (the perceivers)
with a set of racial categories into which we map an individual
human being (the target) according to prevailing rules of racial
mapping. Once a person is assigned to a racial category, implicit
and explicit racial meanings associated with that category are
47 STAN. L. REV. 1161 (1995); Linda Hamilton Krieger, Civil Rights Perestroika: Intergroup
Relations after Affirmative Action, 86 CALIF. L. REv. 1251 (1998).
231. Lane et. al., supra note 230, at 428.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 429.
234. See Reshina M. Saujani, " The Implicit Association Test": A Measure of Unconscious
Racism in Legislative Decision-Making, 8 MICH. J. RACE & L. 395, 406 (2003). Greenwald,
Banaji, and Nosek offer a good general description of what the IAT does. They write that
the IAT "provides a measure of strengths of automatic associations. This measure is com-
puted from performance speeds at two classification tasks in which association strengths
influence performance." Anthony G. Greenwald et al., Understanding and Using the Implicit
Association Test: I. An Improved Scoring Algorithm, 85 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 197,
197 (2003).
235. See Andrew Karpinski & Ross B. Steinman, The Single Category Implicit Associa-
tion Test as a Measure of Implicit Social Cognition, 91 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 16, 23
(2006).
236. Nilanjana Dasgupta, Debbie E. McGhee, Anthony G. Greenwald & Mahzarin R.
Banaji, Automatic Preference for lWhite Americans: Eliminating the Familiarity Explanation, 36 J.
EXPERIMENTAL Soc. PSYCHOL. 316, 317 (2000). This can be explained by system justifica-
tion theory, which holds that members of a society seek to preserve the status quo and
legitimate it as being "good, fair, natural, desirable and even inevitable." John T. Jost, Mah-
zarin R. Banaji & Brian A. Nosek, A Decade of System justification Theory: Accumulated
Evidence of Conscious and Unconscious Bolstering of the Status Quo, 25 POL. PSYCHOL. 881, 887
(2004).
237. Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118 HARv. L. REV. 1489, 1497 (2005).
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triggered. These activated racial meanings then influence our
238interpersonal interaction.
Thus, when interacting with a Black male, to whom society has given
certain negative attributes, the Black male will be categorized as Black
and those attributes are activated, negatively affecting the way in which
we deal with him.
Implicit attitudes and implicit stereotypes are crucial to understand-
ing the science behind implicit social cognition. "Implicit attitudes are
introspectively unidentified (or inaccurately identified) traces of past ex-
perience that mediate favorable or unfavorable feeling, thought, or action
toward social objects."2 39 For instance, a person is likely to favor a familiar
object because of past experience despite being unaware that the previous
familiarity explains the preference.24 0 "Implic1t stereotypes," similarly, "are
the introspectively unidentified (or inaccurately identified) traces of past
experience that mediate attributions of qualities to members of a social
category."241 An example of an implicit stereotype "would be the (mistak-
en) identification that Dave Sebastian is famous, but Diane Sebastian is
not, based on the belief (a correct belief, in this case) that men are more
likely to be famous than women."242
Implicit bias experiments demonstrate how thoroughly unconscious
bias affects the lives of racial minorities. Particularly relevant here are the
simulated environments that replicate the experience of being an armed
cop who has to detect whether deadly force is necessary. Such experi-
ments have been the focus of several laboratory studies243 and have found
conclusive racial bias.244 A person's explicit racial feelings failed to predict
"shooter bias," racial bias affecting the decision to pull the trigger.2 45 I-
246plicit biases, however, did. Indeed, those who were more likely to
238. Id. at 1499.
239. Anthony G. Greenwald & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Implicit Social Cognition:Attitudes,
Self-Esteem, and Stereotypes, 102 PSYCHOL. REV. 4, 8 (1995).
240. Lane et al., supra note 230, at 429.
241. Greenwald et al., supra note 239, at 15.
242. Lane et al., supra note 230, at 429.
243. See Anthony G. Grennwald, Mark A. Oakes & Hunter Hoffian, Targets of Dis-
crimination: Effects of race on responses to weapon holders, 39 J. EXPERIMENTAL Soc. PSYCHOL.
399, 400 (2003); see also B. Keith Payne, Prejudice and Perception: The Role ofAutomatic and
Controlled Process in Misperceiving a Weapon, 81 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 181, 181
(2001). See generally Joshua Correll et al., Across the Thin Blue Line: Police Officers and Racial
Bias in the Decision to Shoot, 92 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 1006 (2007); E. Ashby
Plant & B. Michelle Percuche, The Consequences of Race for Police Officers' Responses to Crim-
inal Suspects, 16 PSYCHOL. Sc. 180 (2005).
244. Lane et. al., supra note 230, at 430.
245. Id.
246. Id.
FALL 2012] 157
Michigan journal of Race & Law
believe the stereotype of Blacks as violent were more likely to mistakenly
247
shoot unarmed Black suspects but not shoot armed White ones.
Implicit bias, though, is not a static phenomenon.m Truly, it can be
reduced over time. For instance, research shows that "exposure to coun-
terstereotypical outgroup members often reduces implicit bias." 25 0 And
when Blacks as a racial group are represented by a revered Black person,
say Oprah Winfrey, studies show implicit attitudes about Blacks become
251
more positive.
Thus far, the judiciary has guarded implicit bias from impacting
equal protection jurisprudence. Judge Charles Breyer, however, in Chin v.
Runnels, strongly suggested his comrades are in error.25 2 Mark Sew Fei
Chin was convicted of second-degree murder and sentenced to nineteen
years to life in prison.253 Chin argued in state court, unsuccessfully, that
Chinese Americans, Filipino Americans and Hispanic Americans were
excluded from serving as forepersons on the grand jury, in violation of his
equal protection rights.254 Chin produced evidence establishing that from
1960 to 1996 there had never been a foreperson from those Asian ethnici-
ties.25 Because the standard of review for federal habeas cases is highly
deferential to the state, Judge Breyer could not overturn the previous rul-
ing.256 Yet, wrote Judge Breyer, if "this matter [were] presented to this
Court for de novo review, the Court would feel compelled to scrutinize
the state court's finding more closely" because "the compelling pattern of
exclusion suggests there may be more to the selection process than meets
the eye."257
247. Id. For implicit bias in medical care, see Alexander R. Green et al., Implicit Bias
among Physicians and its Prediction of Thrombolysis Decisions for Black and White Patients, 22 J.
GEN. INTERNAL MED. 1231 (2007) (showing in a separate scientific experiment that physi-
cians with unconscious anti-Black attitudes were less likely to give Blacks a particular
medical treatment than Whites with identical medical profiles).
248. Lane et. al., supra note 230, at 438.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. 343 F Supp. 2d 891 (N.D. Cal. 2004).
253. Id. at 892.
254. Id.
255. Id. at 895. There was some indication that the statistical evidence from 1960 to
1969 was in dispute. However, from the years 1975-96, the evidence was decidedly more
solid, and therefore "the Court qou]nd[] that the lower court findings of a primafacie case
of discrimination" were reasonably sound. Id. at 895 n.4.
256. See id. at 905. A federal court can only grant a writ if "the court ... find[s] that
the state court's decision was 'objectively unreasonable.'" Id. at 901 (citing Lockyer v. An-
drade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003)).
257. Id. at 905-06.
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The foreperson was chosen by the presiding judge in consultation
258
with the jury commissioner and the district attorney. The jury commis-
sioner testified that he advised judges to select forepersons with
"leadership capability" and other asserted qualities. 259 The state denied that
race was a factor, but Judge Breyer argued that the evidence raised "the
question whether unconscious stereotyping or biases may have contribut-
ed to the exclusion of these groups notwithstanding the best intentions of
those involved." 260 Judge Breyer recognized that many facially neutral cri-
teria are not neutral but "echo the negative stereotypes that have long
plagued Asian-Americans and others" and noted that "Asian-Americans
have been particularly vulnerable to stereotyping and exclusion when
subjective selection criteria enter on 'leadership' and 'people skills. ,"261
Judge Breyer, in other words, observed a subconscious model minority
myth, which depicts Asians as "unassertive and passive" at work and thus
- . .262in the jury foreperson setting.
Perhaps no other Supreme Court case perfectly encapsulates the
problem of equal protection jurisprudence not embracing implicit bias
263
more so than McCleskey v. Kemp. Warren McCleskey, a Black man, was
convicted of armed robbery and the felony-murder of a White police of-
261ficer. McCleskey argued on appeal that Georgia's capital punishment
statute violated the Equal Protection Clause in two ways.2 65 First, defend-
ants who murdered Whites were more likely to be sentenced to death
than those who murdered Blacks.2 66 Second, Black murderers were more
likely to be sentenced to death than White murderers.267 The Court main-
tained that McCleskey carried the virtually impossible burden of proving
the "existence of purposeful discrimination:'268 McCleskey, therefore, had
to establish that "descisionmakers in his case acted with discriminatory
purpose."269
McCleskey relied on the so-called Baldus study, named after David
C. Baldus. The late University of Iowa law professor, with the help of
258. See id. at 893-94.
259. Id. at 896.
260. Id. at 906.
261. Id. at 907.
262. Darren Seiji Teshina, A "Hardy Handshake Sort of Guy": The Model Minority and
Implicit Bias About Asian Americans in Chin v. Runnels, 11 AsiAN PAc. AM. L.J. 122, 123
(2006) (contending that unconscious bias was afoot and that Asian American stereotypes
were the reason why the ethnic group was never chosen as forepersons).
263. See 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
264. Id. at 283.
265. Id. at 291.
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. Id. at 292 (quoting Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545, 550 (1967)).
269. Id. (emphasis in original).
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social scientists, authored a report detailing the stark racial disparities in
sentencing in the Georgia penal system.270 The evidence showed that, dur-
ing a ten year period, Georgia's prosecutors "sought the death penalty in
70% of the cases involving [B]lack defendants and [W]hite victims; 32%
of the cases involving [W]hite defendants and [W]hite victims; 15% of the
cases involving [B]lack defendants and [B]lack victims; and 19% of the
cases involving [W]hite defendants and [B]lack victims." 271 Georgia courts,
additionally, assessed the death penalty "in 22% of the cases involving
[B]lack defendants and [W]hite victims; 8% of the cases involving [W]hite
defendants and [W]hite victims; 1% of the cases involving [B]lack defend-
ants and [B]lack victims; and 3% of the cases involving [W]hite defendants
and [B]lack victims."272 The Court, though, held that McCleskey's statisti-
cal evidence proved neither that his specific jury nor Georgia acted with
any discriminatory purpose. : It was, the Court estimated, "a discrepancy
that appears to correlate with race. Apparent disparities in sentencing are
an inevitable part of our criminal justice system.' 274 McCleskey's death
sentence, accordingly, was upheld.27 5 McCleskey never could have proved
that a jury intentionally sentenced him to death because of his race. That
the Court rejected the salient though not individualized evidence of per-
vasive bias, whether conscious or unconscious, was disastrous for racial
minorities.
B. The Case for Change
Beyond cataloguing the problems with the Intent Doctrine, it is also
crucial to formulate a normative understanding as to why the Equal Pro-
tection Clause should be responsive to these particular concerns. "To save
antidiscrimination law," writes Professor Samuel R. Bagenstos, "requires
articulating and defending the normative principles that justify and guide
the application of that law to newly understood forms of bias, whatever
they are, and however they are discovered."2 76 This is the ambition for this
section.
Before proceeding further, though, it is necessary to carefully re-
spond to an inevitable response to this Article's endeavor of creating a
new way of interpreting the Equal Protection Clause-the Originalist
270. Id. at 286. See generally DAVID C. BALDUS ET AL., EQUAL JUSTICE AND THE DEATH
PENALTY (1990).
271. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 287.
272. Id. at 286.
273. Id. at 297-98.
274. Id. at 312.
275. Id. at 319.
276. Bagenstos, supra note 56, at 493.
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challenge. 277 The argument is that the ratifying generation's original un-
derstanding of the Equal Protection Clause did not embrace notions of
unconscious bias or structural racism. Such considerations, therefore, must
lie outside the zone in which the Equal Protection Clause operates.
As an initial matter, I reject categorically that the ratifying genera-
tion's conception of equal protection should affect contemporary
jurisprudence. And, interestingly enough, self-described Originalists on
the Supreme Court agree with me here. Indeed, the equal protection
opinions penned by Justices Thomas and Scalia should confound anyone
with even a cursory knowledge of the congressional debates of 1865 and
1866. Both Justice Thomas and Scalia contend that the Constitution is
27 279
colorblind.27 8 That, however, is a risible claim for an Originalist. justices
Scalia and Thomas, moreover, argue that affirmative action in education is
unconstitutional despite the fact that the same congressmen who drafted
the Fourteenth Amendment supervised segregated education in Washing-
ton D.C., establishing that using race to make education policy was never
understood to be unconstitutional. Thus, if, say, Michigan can exclude
Blacks from White schools in the 1870s, Michigan can also use race to
include them over a century later. The Congressmen also passed legisla-
tion specifically geared to help "colored persons."2 80 justice Scalia even
intimated that disparate impact provisions are unconstitutional. Nothing
from the Congressional Globe, however, supports this position. 281 My
basic point is that even those professing fidelity to original understanding
282
cheat on their philosophy in equal protection contexts.
Equally important is that the Intent Doctrine is not required by a tex-
tual reading of the Equal Protection Clause. The Equal Protection Clause
reads that "no state shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
277. See generally Starkey, Inconsistent Oriqinalism, supra note * (making this argument
in a forthcoming publication).
278. See James L. McAlister, A Pigment of the Imagination: Looking at Affirmative Action
through justice Scalia's Color-Blind Rule, 77 MARQ. L. REV. 327 (1994); see also Angela
Onwuachi-Willig,Just Another Brother on the SCT?: WhatJustice Clarence Thomas Teaches Us
About the Influence of Racial Identity, 90 IowA L. REv. 931, 1005 (2005).
279. See Jeffrey Rosen, The Color-Blind Court, 45 AM. U. L. REV. 791, 791 (1996)
("An examination of the historical evidence suggests that the original intentions of the
radical Republicans in 1865 are flamboyantly inconsistent with the color-blind jurispru-
dence of the conservatives Justices in 1995."). Even if one might argue that the
Constitution is colorblind, the best argument would be that it is a narrow conception of
colorblindness impacting an exclusive packet of rights only. See generally Earl M. Maltz, A
Minimalist Approach to the Fourteenth Amendment, 19 HAR.J. L. & Pus. PoL'Y 451 (1996).
280. Jed Rubenfeld, Affirmative Action, 107 YALE L.J. 427, 431 (1997).
281. Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2682-83 (2009) (Scalia, J., concurring). In
fact, I implore Justice Scalia or anyone agreeing with his position to find the phrase "dis-
parate impact," "disproportionate impact," or anything analogous in any contemporaneous
writing of the period.
282. Starkey, Inconsistent Originalism, supra note * at 29.
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equal protection of the laws." Nothing therein requires that the judiciary
confine its search to specific intent. As this Article argued before, the In-
tent Doctrine was originally adopted in the 1890s by a Court seeking to
maintain the racial status quo of inequality and discrimination. Even in
the 1950s, those wanting to limit the effectiveness and reach of employ-
ment discrimination law sought to define the core concern as one of
intentional invidious discrimination only.283 The Intent Doctrine, in other
words, has long been understood to entrench, rather than palliate, racial
subordination. Racism in contemporary society is an amalgamation of
various factors: structural, unconscious, covert, and overt discrimination.
But, the Intent Doctrine only responds to the last form of discrimina-
tion-that reminiscent of Jim Crow-and only when the discriminator
admits to it or lazily leaves a paper trail.
In a way, the Intent Doctrine functions similarly to the political-
civil-social rights distinctions of the late nineteenth century. Both, more
specifically, prevented rather than facilitated the cause of racial equality.
Civil rights "covered the right to contract, sue, give evidence in court, and
inherit, hold, and dispose of real and personal property., 28 4 Political rights
were synonymous with suffrage rights. 285 And, for instance, the right for
Black school children to attend integrated schools was included in the
so-called "social rights."286 As Professor Reva Siegel writes, "the civil-
political-social rights distinction ... offered a framework within which
[W]hite Americans could disestablish slavery, guarantee the emancipated
slaves equality at law, and yet continue to justify policies and practices that
perpetuated the racial stratification of American society."2 87 The same
holds true with the Intent Doctrine. As the political-civil-social distinc-
tion kept Jim Crow upright until Brown, the Intent Doctrine "stands as a
gateway to challenges concerning residential zoning, education, and the
operation of the criminal justice system."288
As was true with the political-civil-social rights distinctions, the In-
tent Doctrine promotes a racial pecking order that relegates people of
color to a subordinate position. This Article will investigate a few hypo-
theticals to illustrate why this is true.
One issue is that discriminatory motives are hard to prove. A signifi-
cant sticking point in debating the propriety of the Intent Doctrine is that
debate participants widely disagree on the salience of racism in contem-
283. See Susan D. Carle, A Social Movement History of Title VII Disparate Impact Analysis,
63 FIA. L. REv. 251,284 (2011).
284. Alexander M. Bickel, Orginal Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 69 HAn.
L. REV. 1, 56 (1955).
285. See Mark Tushnet, Civil Rights and Social Rights: The Future of the Reconstruction
Amendment, 25 Lov. L.A. L. REv. 1207, 1207 (1992).
286. See id. at 1207 n.2.
287. Siegel, supra note 212, at 1129.
288. Id. at 1140.
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2819porary society. Imagine, therefore, a reality where a police department-
the Garden City Police Department (GCPD)-unequivocally administers
stop and frisk tactics in a racially discriminatory fashion. The existence of
discrimination is not, therefore, an issue here. Blacks and Hispanics largely
control the GCPD, and Whites are being denied their Fourth Amendment
rights on the basis of race. How, then, does Andre, a White resident of
Garden City, prove that Garden City and its police department are deny-
ing Whites equal protection? Now remember, the hypothetical concedes
that Whites are being deprived of equal protection. The only issue here is
whether, under the Intent Doctrine, Andre can prove a violation. Obvi-
ously Andre will need some evidence of direct proof. He has statistics. But
those numbers, like in McCleskey, will not suffice to prove an equal pro-
tection violation.290 Police officers, moreover, would never admit that they
had discriminatory intent. How, then, do Andre and other White residents
of Garden City establish their equal protection claims? They simply
cannot. Here, I have painted a world where we know unconstitutional
discrimination is occurring but the Constitution provides no remedy. It
would, in fact, be a waste of time and money for Garden City's White
residents to pursue a lawsuit.
This hypothetical establishes just how inappropriate an intent stand-
ard is in remedying discrimination. It reveals how our judiciary is
pretending it functions in an alternate universe where the inherent diffi-
culty of proving intent is beyond comprehension. Supporters of the Intent
Doctrine, in the real world, must seriously grapple with this undeniable
fact: the standard renders it nearly impossible to prove equal protection
deprivations. An intentional discriminator, in fact, would be hard pressed
to locate a more favorable standard on which to be judged.
Indeed, who exactly does the Intent Doctrine protect? Based on the
hypothetical, Andre and other White citizens of Garden City certainly are
not protected. The Intent Doctrine, rather, provided ample safety to the
perpetrators of discrimination, the GCPD. This hypothetical does not fea-
ture an anomalistic fact pattern either. In nearly every scenario
imaginable, the Intent Doctrine is more beneficial to the discriminatory
actor than the target of unconstitutional racial discrimination. How then
can we claim to offer citizens equal protection if our manner of assessing
claims of racial discrimination is far more lenient to the discriminator
than his target?
I want to revisit the jury discrimination cases to further establish the
problem with the Intent Doctrine. In Norris, recall that the Court held
that the long absence of Blacks serving on juries established a prima facie
289. This feeling is closely related to the idea that America is post-racial. See generally
Mario L. Barnes, Erwin Chemerinsky & Trina Jones, A Post-Race Equal Protection?, 98 GEO.
L.J. 967 (2010); Ian E Haney Lopez, Post-Racial Racism: Racial Stratification and Mass Incar-
ceration in the Age of Obana, 98 CALIF. L. REv. 1023 (2010).
290. See generally McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
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case of intentional discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection
Clause. The next jury discrimination case the Supreme Court heard after
Norris was Hollins v. Oklahoma.9 Jess Hollins was accused of raping a
White woman and given a sham trial.292 The Court relied upon Norris to
293
overturn his conviction. But those championing the Intent Doctrine
would have to disagree with both the holding in Norris and its application
in Hollins if they were to remain true to the doctrine. In Norris, one might
claim that the doctored jury rolls established intent. But why not make
Hollins prove that Oklahoma intentionally kept the jury all-White? If
intent is the right standard, why must we resort to proxies of discrimina-
tion, like long absence from juries, to prove an equal protection violation?
Racism in Oklahoma during the 1930s was expressed much more openly
than racism is expressed today. Yet, no reasonable thinker today would
have required Hollins to prove that the jury which sentenced him to
death was intentionally kept all-White. A Black person living in a stifling-
ly racist state during the Jim Crow Era had little chance of getting the
same racial majority doing the discrimination to make a finding that they
were intentionally discriminating. How, then, can we expect a person to
prove intent today, a time where racism is decidedly less open?
A possible explanation for this intellectual inconsistency is that it is
less palatable to permit states to exclude Blacks from juries in order to
railroad Black criminal defendants, and thus, a narrow exception to the
intent standard is allowed. But other circumstances, say racial profiling,
may not elicit the same sort of visceral reaction; thus, the impossibly high
burden in such contexts is maintained.
An earlier portion of Part II pointed to the wealth of social science
literature that details the salience of unconscious bias and how such biases
hinder the lives of racial minorities. But just showing that unconscious
bias is real is not the objective. The objective, rather, is to illustrate why
equal protection jurisprudence must respond to this literature. It is essen-
tial, then, to delineate how our conception of equal protection is faulty
unless we take stock of unconscious bias. This Article claims that America
cannot truly claim to offer its citizens equal protection while leaving a
person who has been the victim of implicit bias without a constitutional
remedy. To illustrate this position, re-investigating a reconfigured Garden
City will prove beneficial.
In this updated Garden City, Whites generally hold the power. No
Whites harbor any conscious negative feelings toward people of color.Yet,
all Whites have such strong implicit biases that governance in the city
291. See 295 U.S. 394, 395 (1935).
292. Id. See Oklahoman Snatched From Electric Chair as New Trial is Finally Granted, THE
PITTSBURGH COURIER, Sept. 24,1932, at Al.
293. Hollins, 295 U.S. at 395.
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routinely produces debilitating anti-minority outcomes. In this case,
should the Equal Protection Clause operate?
If the Equal Protection Clause should offer relief in the hypothetical,
must not it also offer relief in the real world? America is not rife with such
debilitating implicit bias as seen in the hypothetical. But the implicit bias
research is settled on the existence of extant biases that reinforces racial
subordination. One might argue that if implicit bias were so widespread
that racial minorities were unable to, say, get a fair shake as a criminal de-
fendant then the Equal Protection Clause should offer some relief. In the
real world, unconscious discrimination harms racial minorities. Are people
of color, then, only provided relief when unconscious bias is incapacitating?
One who would answer "yes" would seemingly insist that unconscious bias
plays no role in equal protection jurisprudence unless bias is crippling. The
idea, though, is troubling. Indeed, such an argument seems hard to defend.
These hypotheticals illustrate just how odd it is to demand that the
Equal Protection Clause be defined so narrowly as to only protect racial
minorities from intentionally discriminatory behavior. The Intent Doc-
trine, in fact, is not just a poor standard; it is often an active participant in
the denial of equal protection. That is, to force racial minorities to prove
their claims of unconstitutional racial discrimination through a motive-
centered inquiry without any other options should be understood as a
conscious choice to frustrate the cause of racial equality.
Intent proponents offer various defenses of the Intent Doctrine.
Supporters generally believe that the Equal Protection Clause guarantees
equal opportunity but not equality of results." If the intent standard is
jettisoned, then the assumption is that the Court would have to embrace a
295disparate impact test for equal protection. Under a disparate impact test,
a state might have "to adopt an affirmative action plan in its hiring and
promotion practices" to not run afoul of the Equal Protection Clause,
which gives minorities special rights rather than equality, or so the argu-
ment holds.2 96 An additional reason offered in support of the Intent
Doctrine is that acts of the legislature should not be undone unless the
217democratic process has been marred by discriminatory actions. Along
those lines, some believe that absent illicit purposes, discriminatory effects
294. OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, REPORT TO THE ATT'Y GEN.T HE
CONSTITUTION IN THE YEAR 2000: CHoicEs AHEAD IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION
50-55 (1988).
295. Id. at 55.
296. Id. at 54.
297. Barbara J. Flagg, "Was Blind, But Now I See": White Race Consciousness and the
Requirement of Discriminatory Intent, 91 MicH. L. REV. 953, 968 (1993).What I am referring
to here is process theory. For a defense, see generally Symposium on Democracy and Distrust:
Ten Years Later, 77 VA. L. REv. 631 (1991). Cf Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene
Products, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713 (1985); Laurence H. Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Pro-
cess-Based Constitutional Theories, 89 YALE L.J. 1063 (1980).
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must not be the concern of the judiciary. As Robert W Bennett writes,
"without concern about past and present intent, racially discriminatory
effects of legislation would be quite innocent."298 Intent, in other words, is
.299
a necessary component of any discriminatory action.
The problem, however, is that proponents of the Intent Doctrine se-
lect a standard that is inconsistent with their own principles. The Garden
City hypothetical where Whites were victims of discriminatory stop and
frisk tactics featured illicit purposes. However, under the Intent Doctrine
the White victims could not prove that they were being denied equality
under the law. Thus, even those who link a denial of equal protection to
intentional discrimination should also abandon the Intent Doctrine be-
cause those who are being intentionally discriminated against cannot
prove as such. The only champions of the Intent Doctrine, therefore,
should be those who conclude that whatever perceived benefits of this
standard outweigh the manifest discrimination it permits.
300
My understanding of what equal protection entails is as follows: to
deny someone equal protection is to either (1) allow stringent constitu-
tional interpretive standards to prevent the possibility of a person from
having a meaningful opportunity of proving that they have been denied
equality on the basis of race, or (2) to force a person to prove their equal
protection complaints in a vacuum that ignores both the effects America's
sordid racial past has on the present and the myriad of ways that a person
can be denied equal protection on the basis of race. If this is the norma-
tive mediating principle of the Equal Protection Clause, then it becomes
clear that the leaky Intent Doctrine must be set ashore.
III.THE PROFFERED SOLUTIONS
This section will examine various replacements to the Intent Doc-
trine and put their strengths and weaknesses to the test. The central
evaluative criterion is whether these replacements will produce an equal
protection violation in Floyd, the New York discriminatory stop and frisk
lawsuit. Some scholars have championed a motive-centered inquiry in
298. Robert W Bennett, "Mere" Rationality In Constitutional Law: Judicial Review and
Democratic Theory, 67 CALIF. L. REv. 1049, 1076 (1979).
299. Barbara Flagg argues that the intent requirement is "a distinctively [W]hite way
of thinking about race" because "[V]hite people tend to view intent as an essential ele-
ment of racial harm" while "nonwhites do not." Flagg, supra note 297, at 968.
300. This principle might appear similar to Owen Fiss's antidiscrimination principle,
and perhaps, it is comparable. But my response is that I argue that constitutional interpre-
tation should be seen as a participant in discriminatory state action. See generally Owen M.
Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107 (1976).
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equal protection cases,"' but under such a standard, a court would have
little choice but to rule for New York City in Floyd.
This Part also inspects the proffered solutions to assess whether they
satisfy other, more general considerations. First, the solution cannot re-
semble a disparate impact test. In Washington v. Davis, the Supreme Court
declared that disproportionate impact would not give rise to strict scruti-
ny.302 It is, therefore, incumbent upon detractors of the Intent Doctrine to
forge new ground and not merely repackage previously excluded options.
An additional concern is that the test must be reliable. If the Equal Pro-
tection Clause, for racial minorities, has been effectively stricken through
in the Constitution, then any fix should be dependable. It should not be
effective in some situations but not in others. And last, the solution, by its
terms, must meet the needs of racial minorities. The most promising solu-
tion, in other words, will provide relief in the contexts in which
minorities are most vulnerable.
A. Professor Theodore Eisenberg and the "Causation Principle"
Professor Theodore Eisenberg champions the causation principle as
a means of resolving the heavy evidentiary burdens posed by proving in-
tent. By requiring claimants to trace an equal protection deprivation back
to a discriminatory motive, Professor Eisenberg contends that the Davis
Court misjudged "where the line ought to be drawn.,0 3 Professor Eisen-
berg, though, posits that the Court wisely settled on a interpretative
standard for the Equal Protection Clause that limits governmental liability
for some racially disparate impacts." The problem, however, according to
Professor Eisenberg, is that in too many cases the Intent Doctrine
301. See, e.g., Paul Brest, Reflections on Motive Review, 15 SA DIEGo L. REV. 1141
(1978). Though, to be fair to Brest, he is arguing against those contending that as long as
the legislative enactment is facially valid, no equal protection issue arises. Id. at 1142. See
also Paul Brest, Palmer v. Thompson: An Approach to the Problem of Unconstitutional Motive,
1971 Sup. CT. REV 95, 130 (1971) ( "A court should entertain an action challenging an
otherwise constitutional decision ... on the ground that it was designed in part to serve an
illicit or suspect objective."). Again, Brest was arguing against the holding in Palmer v.
Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971), that the Jackson, Mississippi legislative racist motivation to
close city swimming pools was constitutionally irrelevant. Cf John Hart Ely, The Centrality
and Limits of Motivation Analysis, 15 SA DIEGo L. REV. 1155, 1161 (1978). Ely claimed that
a motivational analysis is only appropriate when the deprivation is not the subject of a
substantive constitutional right or what he terms "constitutionally gratuitous." Id. But
"where what is denied is something to which the complainant has a substantive constitutional right-
either because it is granted by the terms of the Constitution ... the reasons it was denied are
irrelevant." Id. (emphasis in original).
302. 426 U.S. 229,239 (1976).
303. Theodore Eisenberg, Disproportionate Impact and Illicit Motive: Theories of Constitu-
tionalAdjudication, 52 N.YU. L. REv. 36, 61 (1977).
304. Id.
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provides no remedy.o Its scope is too narrow. Professor Eisenberg's causa-
tion principle is premised on his belief that strict scrutiny should arise
when unintentional disparate impact is "reasonably attributable to race.
06
The causation principle is derived heavily from tort law and "instructs a
court to subject official actions to heightened scrutiny whenever the
plaintiff can show that race was both a cause in fact and a proximate cause
of disproportionate impact on minorities.'3 0 7 The basic premise of the
causation principle is that no person should suffer a disadvantage from a
301governmental action if the disadvantage is reasonably related to race.
Thus, the causation principle in the context of discrimination cases pro-
vides redress for any disparate impact that can either be traced back to
previously invidious state conduct, say a Jim Crow statute, or when the
state reacted to or promoted private discrimination.3o9 An example of the
latter could include a city council that, reacting to a discriminatory elec-
torate, passes an ordinance that prevents the turning of a city-owned
building into a Hispanic cultural center.32
There are two levels to the causation principle: cause-in-fact and
proximate cause. Both must be satisfied in order to sustain an equal pro-
tection violation.3 1 1 Cause-in-fact is the "but for" causation requirement
based in tort law.312 Here, the plaintiff alleging discrimination must show
that the disparate impact would not have occurred but for a "prior official
or private race-dependent decision."' An example of an official race-
dependent decision might be a former law that statutorily denied Blacks
the right to vote.314 Such a statute, Professor Eisenberg posits, may pro-
duce diluted voting power long after its enactment. ' An example of a
private race-dependent decision that can produce a disparate impact is the
instance of a state providing a liquor license to an establishment that de-
nies Blacks service.316 But for the private discrimination, Blacks would not
obviously face disparate treatment. Because of the state's close connection
with the private discrimination in such a hypothetical, Professor Eisen-
berg believes the state should be liable for the private discrimination.
305. Id. at 63.
306. Id. at 57.
307. Id. at 57-58.
308. Id. at 62.
309. Id. at 64-65.
310. See id. at 65.
311. Id. at 64, 66.
312. Id. at 58.
313. Id. at 64.
314. Id. at 65.
315. Id.
316. Id.
317. See id.
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Proximate cause, the second level of the causation principle, reduces
governmental liability by requiring a close connection between "the race-
dependent decision and the uneven impact."318 Proximate cause also
requires that no intervening forces exist.3 9 For instance, criminal law stat-
utes, Professor Eisenberg explains, create disparate impacts because Blacks
are convicted of crimes at higher rates.320 "A court might conclude that this
uneven impact would not have occurred but for widespread discrimination
against blacks," satisfying the cause-in-fact prong.321 "But the connection
between general discrimination and specific crimes is relatively indirect."32
The volitional aspect of crime conmiission, moreover, (the perpetrator has
direct control over whether he violates a criminal statute) is an intervening
cause that a court would have to acknowledge.3 23 The disparate impact,
therefore, is "not reasonably attributable to race.'3 24
Professor Eisenberg also correctly notes that the Intent Doctrine
works fairly well when intent can be proven, when a statute is facially
discriminatory, or when disproportionate impact is so glaring from statis-
tical disparities.325 Professor Eisenberg holds that the causation principle
will make the Equal Protection Clause operable in more situations.32 6 And
in the specific instance seen in Davis, the causation principle might lead
to a different result, Professor Eisenberg opines.327 Past school segrega-
tion-a prior race-based discriminatory policy-very well may have led
to lower test results for Black test takers.328
Critiquing it generally, the main problem with Professor Eisenberg's
causation principle as applied to equal protection is its narrowness. The
causation principle is the doctor tending to a patient's scratches while ig-
noring the gunshot wounds. It does nothing to ease the burden of
proving intent and has no power to deal with unconscious bias, perhaps
its most glaring defects. Racial minorities' most salient critique of equal
protection, furthermore, has little to do with excusing the government for
behavior that is tied closely enough to private discriminatory actions to
warrant minorities' having a cause of action.329 Very infrequently, moreo-
ver, can Blacks' inequality be traced directly back to a past facially
318. Id. at 66.
319. Id. at 66-67.
320. Id. at 67.
321. Id.
322. Id.
323. Id.
324. Id.
325. fd. at 62-63.
326. Id. at 63.
327. Id. at 74.
328. Id. at 74-75.
329. Though, admittedly, a standard that would invalidate a law enacted by a legisla-
ture in response to anti-mnority sentiment would be useful.
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discriminatory statute. Now, it must be acknowledged that Professor Ei-
senberg penned his Article in 1977, and every piece of writing reflects the
era in which it was drafted. Perhaps the causation principle was more use-
ful in the 1970s. However, in contemporary society where prejudice is
increasingly covert, it misses the point.
More importantly, the causation principle, if applied in Floyd, would
likely fail to produce an equal protection violation. The best argument to
the contrary is that past racial discrimination might today lead to police
officers viewing Black and Hispanic males as more threatening. This
would satisfy the cause-in-fact requirement. That past racial discrimina-
tion, though, is highly attenuated from the present day occurrence of a
White cop frisking a Black suspect with no reasonable suspicion. Most
courts, that is, would find no proximate cause.130 Proximate cause requires
directness. Professor Eisenberg makes a similar point regarding criminal
laws and crime rates in the Black population. Professor Eisenberg writes
that "the connection between general discrimination and specific crimes
is relatively indirect" in that context. A comparable issue is presented here.
Thus, the causation principle is unlikely to lead a court to conclude that
New York City's stop and frisk policies violate the Equal Protection
Clause. 3 1 Professor Eisenberg's replacement for the Intent Doctrine, in
short, fails to produce the solution to which this Article is dedicated: find-
ing an equal protection solution to the discriminatory stop and frisk
policies challenged in Floyd.
B. Professor Charles Lawrence and the Cultural Meaning Test
Perhaps an overlooked aspect of his article, The Id, the Ego and Equal
Protection, is Professor Lawrence's substitute for the Intent Doctrine: the
cultural meaning test. After arguing that American discrimination is often
the product of an unconscious mind, Professor Lawrence avers that courts
should, therefore, examine whether a purportedly discriminatory action
conveys a negative "cultural meaning" and jettison its search for discrimi-
natory intent.332 "This test," in Professor Lawrence's own words, "would
evaluate governmental conduct to see if it conveys a symbolic message to
which the culture attaches racial significance.""' According to Professor
Lawrence, under this test, judges would be akin to cultural anthropolo-
330. Eisenberg makes this point regarding the issue of criminal law and race. Eisen-
berg, supra note 303, at 67.
331. A judge who is most dedicated to the cause of racial justice very well might find
an equal protection violation. But I believe the case is hard to make.
332. Lawrence, supra note 212, at 355-56.
333. Id. at 356.
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gists3 who would, in light of historical developments and current social
contexts, assess whether governmental conduct furthers a racial mean-
ing.3 1 "If the court determined by a preponderance of the evidence that a
significant portion of the population thinks of the governmental action in
racial terms, then it would presume that socially shared, unconscious racial
attitudes made evident by the action's meaning had influenced the
decisionmakers."3 Once a cultural meaning is detected, strict scrutiny
applies.
Professor Lawrence illustrates how the cultural meaning test, a test
which also applies to the First Amendment's Establishment Clause, would
function in equal protection situations by investigating past Supreme
Court decisions .3 Professor Lawrence investigates Brown v. Board of Edu-
cation," suggesting it would have been an easy case for the Court to
decide.340 The nine Justices, argues Professor Lawrence, would have de-
clared segregated public schools unconstitutional because society would
have no choice but to conclude that Jim Crow schools conveyed the cul-
tural meaning of Black inferiority.
City of Memphis v. Greene, according to Professor Lawrence, would
likewise present an easy opportunity for judges to invalidate a govern-
mental action through the use of the cultural meaning test.342 Memphis,
like all southern cities, had a troubling racial past and maintained de jure
segregation until 1965.'" It would be impossible, Professor Lawrence be-
lieves, to conclude that less than a generation after the dismantling of Jim
Crow that constructing a barrier between Black and White communities
would not carry a cultural meaning; more to the point, the barrier sig-
naled the racial inferiority of Blacks.3 4 "In the contextual reality of
Memphis," Lawrence asserts, "the message is as clear as if the declaration
were painted on the wall itself."' A court, therefore, would find that
building the barrier violated the Equal Protection Clause.
334. See id. at 358 (claiming that some legal scholars don't agree with this point but
have no problem with the use of economics in the judiciary).
335. Id. at 356.
336. Id.
337. See id.
338. See id. at 359.
339. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
340. Lawrence, supra note 212, at 362-63.
341. See id. at 363.
342. Id. at 363-64. Remember, Greene concerned Blacks in Memphis claiming that
the building of a barrier between all-White and all-Black sections of town was constitu-
tionally impermissible. See generally City of Memphis v. Greene, 451 U.S. 100 (1981).
343. Lawrence, supra note 212, at 363.
344. Id. at 364.
345. Id.
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Professor Lawrence also discusses more borderline Supreme Court
cases, including Washington v. Davis.34" Here again, Professor Lawrence
contends that the cultural meaning test would render the hiring policies
unconstitutional."' "Despite the race-neutral origins of civil service exams
as a generic entity, one has an intuitive sense that their use in this case has
racial connotations-that this case is more like the Memphis wall than it
is like an increased bus fare or a regressive tax."348 Test 21, the exam that
Washington D.C.'s police department used to make its hiring decisions,
would violate the Equal Protection Clause because it would cause Ameri-
cans to interpret the results as connoting Black inferiority.
To counter the assumption that the cultural meaning test is limitless,
Professor Lawrence discusses the hypothetical instance of an increase in
railway fare in a racially and economically diverse city.o The increased
fare will disproportionately affect racial minorities; people of color, after
all, generally have less wealth and lower incomes.' America, however, has
"no history of using bus or train fares as a way to designate nonwhites as
inferior," Professor Lawrence claims.352 Professor Lawrence further main-
tains that there is no legacy of thinking of transportation fares in racial
terms."5 An increase in railway fare, therefore, could not lead to an equal
protection violation.
While it has some merit, the cultural meaning test fails on a few lev-
els. First, it is counter-intuitive. Professor Lawrence proffers a great
argument describing how racism is often unconscious, yet his test forces
the very same people who he contends have unwittingly buried their bi-
ases to then search for the cultural meaning of certain behaviors. Won't
judges just embrace an alternate explanation over finding a racial mean-
ing? Professor Lawrence's confidence that judges would have "an intuitive
sense" that Test 21 carries a negative cultural meaning seems misguided.
Along those lines, Professor Lawrence greatly overstates how obvi-
ous cultural meaning is in certain contexts. Does Lawrence truly believe
that he and Justice Scalia, for instance, will agree on the cultural meanings
that governmental actions convey in varying contexts? The effectiveness
of the cultural meaning test, more pointedly, depends highly upon who's
behind the bench. The test can work well if Professor Lawrence is don-
ning the long black robe, but in the hands of others--specifically jurists
346. Id. at 369.
347. Id. at 369-76.
348. Id. at 370.
349. Id. at 373.
350. See id. at 364.
351. See generally MELVIN L. OLIVER & THOMAS M. SHAPIRO, BLACK WEALTH, WHITE
WEALTH:A NEW PERSPECTIVE ON RACIAL INEQUALITY (2008).
352. Lawrence, supra note 212, at 365.
353. Id.
354. See id.
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who do not or choose not to see the salience of race-the cultural mean-
ing test will produce the same results that perturb Professor Lawrence.
But, for the sake of argument, let's say that judges will be able to dis-
cern history properly and find cultural meanings where they exist. What
Professor Lawrence fails to appreciate is that there could be a cultural
meaning in nearly everything that occurs in American society. Professor
Lawrence makes the point that there is no history of using fare to subju-
gate Blacks; thus, a transportation fare increase carries no cultural
meaning. However, there is no doubt that there is a sad legacy of using
Blacks' lack of economic vitality to subjugate them. Take peonage, for
instance.5 The entire scheme depended on Blacks' lack of wealth. Profes-
sor Lawrence, therefore, is wrong. One certainly could find a cultural
meaning in increased fares.
For the purposes of this Article, moreover, the cultural meaning test
cannot be counted upon to combat discriminatory Terry stops. One can-
not be certain, that is, that a court deciding Floyd using a cultural meaning
test would find an equal protection violation. I remain convinced, as an
initial matter, that a judge who rejects the unconscious bias narrative that
Professor Lawrence recounts will most likely fail to see a conveyed nega-
tive cultural meaning in Floyd. In any event, if Professor Lawrence would
contend that the cultural meaning test would lead a judge to invalidate
New York City's stop and frisk policies, the argument would likely be that
the policies carry a cultural meaning that Blacks and Hispanics are violent
and criminally predisposed.5  Professor Lawrence might accept that ar-
gument. But would Justice Clarence Thomas? A jurist like Justice Thomas
would likely insist that there is no cultural meaning conveyed by New
York City's stop and frisk policies. And even if such a jurist did see a
negative conveyed cultural meaning that would only mean that strict
scrutiny applied. Because such judges are typically highly deferential to
law enforcement, strict scrutiny, in this circumstance, would not be fatal in
fact. Indeed, the chances are slim that the cultural meaning test, as applied
in Floyd, would result in an equal protection violation in this circum-
stance.
From the opposite perspective, a judge who could ascertain a cultur-
al meaning conveyed by New York's stop and frisk tactics could also
discern a cultural meaning conveyed by the entire criminal justice system.
The death penalty, prosecutorial discretion, sentencing, arrests, and even
more, could possibly be susceptible to equal protection attacks. There are
possible equal protection violations in all of these areas. But, the cultural
meaning test would produce very disparate judicial decisions largely
355. See generally Benno C. Schmidt, Jr., Principle and Prejudice: The Supreme Court and
Race in the Progressive Era. Part 2: The Peonage Cases, 82 CoUM. L. REv. 646 (1982).
356. 1 am not sure whether Lawrence would make this contention.
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depending upon individual judge's personal predilections. It cannot, simp-
ly put, be trusted.
Professor Lawrence erred in championing the cultural meaning test.
Rather, Lawrence's detailing of unconscious bias should have led him to
endorse an objective test. Instead, he opted for a subjective one that
ignores the important lesson his own article instructs: unconscious bias
negatively impacts racial minorities' ability to enjoy the fruits ofAmerican
democracy. If one believes that to be true, then it makes little sense to
promote a standard that permits those same unconscious biases to contin-
ue to reign supreme.
C. Professor Derek Black and Deliberate Indiference
Professor Derek W Black has devised a solution similar to the one
presented in this Article, but it is different in important respects that I will
flesh out later.5 Professor Black argues that the Intent Doctrine is incon-
gruous with both the Framer's original understanding and a "fair meaning
of equal protection.""" This compels him to embrace a deliberate indiffer-
ence standard.3 9 Professor Black's deliberate indifference standard is a
four-pronged objective test.36o First, the government has to be aware or
should be aware of the racial harms or "impacts that its actions caused or
the benefits/opportunities it denied."3 6 1 Second, there have to be reasona-
ble alternatives available. 362 If these first two prongs are satisfied, the court
then moves to the third prong, which explores why other alternatives
were not used.363 And fourth, there must be interests that justify the racial
harm.6  Under the last two prongs, "if the defendant cannot justify the
choice to perpetuate a racial harm-in spite of available alternatives-
with some governmental purpose that outweighs the racial harm, then
the deliberate indifference standard would find that equal protection had
been denied."365
Professor Black champions this standard because, unlike the Intent
Doctrine, deliberate indifference does not perpetuate the status quo by
forcing minorities to prove that which often cannot be proved: intentional
357. See generally Derek W Black, The Contradiction Between Equal Protection's Meaning
and Its Legal Substance: How Deliberate Indifference Can Cure It, 15 Wm. & MARy BILL RTs.J.
533 (2006-2007).
358. Id. at 575.
359. Id. (noting Black's standard of deliberate indifference is different from deliberate
indifference used in other areas of the law).
360. Id.
361. Id.
362. Id.
363. Id.
364. Id.
365. Id.
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discrimination.3 66 "A deliberate indifference standard," Black maintains,
"forces the status quo to justify itself."3 67
One obvious criticism is Black's replacement of intent when allow-
ing claimants to also prove an equal protection violation through his new
standard makes more. sense. That is to say, Professor Black should permit
claimants to prove an equal protection violation through proving deliber-
ate indifference or intent. A hypothetical will explain the dilemma. Let's
say that Officer Smith willingly concedes that race was the reason why he
stopped and frisked Michael, a Hispanic male walking in Beverly Hills.
Under Professor Black's equal protection jurisprudence, Michael must
prove that Officer Smith was deliberately indifferent. It's pretty clear, how-
ever, that Officer Smith was not deliberately indifferent; he was patently
racist.Was Michael, then, denied equal protection? Perhaps a court would
conclude "yes," but not accounting for this is a flaw in Professor Black's
equal protection vision.
If Professor Black's test were used in Floyd, it quite possibly could
lead to an equal protection violation. That's true because Professor Black's
test is a disparate impact test that the Supreme Court has declared inappli-
cable at least since Washington v. Davis and consistently thereafter. In
essence, Professor Black's test requires governments to monitor their poli-
cies, ensure that racially disparate impacts do not occur, and, if these
uneven impacts exist, the state had better have a good excuse or equal
protection has been denied. This is true for disparate impact as well. The
most fatal assessment I can level is that I cannot envision a scenario where
disparate impact would void a policy that Black's deliberate indifference
would permit and vice versa. As mentioned earlier, those seeking to re-
place the Intent Doctrine must devise new solutions and not repackage
old ones.
D. United States v. City of NewYork3 "' and
Historical Deliberate Indifference
"I would say this is pretty big,3 69 said NewYork Law School Professor
Elise Boddie when responding to the surprising news that Judge Nicholas
G. Garaufis found that New York City had intentionally discriminated
against Black and minority firefighters. In United States v. City of New York,
the Justice Department originally sued New York City for discriminatory
employment practices under Title VII, which is governed by disparate
366. Id. at 577.
367. Id.
368. 683 E Supp. 2d 225 (E.D.N.Y 2010).
369. Al Baker,Judge Finds 'Intentional Discrimination' Against Blacks in Fire Department
Hiring., N.Y TIMES, Jan. 14, 2010, at A30.
370. Id.
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impact theory.37' The Vulcan Society, a Black firefighter's organization,372
intervened and sued for intentional discrimination under the Equal Pro-
tection Clause.7 Their intervention compelled the court to determine
whether the city had purposefully discriminated against aspiring minority
firefighters. The disparate impact claim was far easier to decide.3 74 Whether
the city had intentionally discriminated against minorities was another
matter; it is a question that has proved exceedingly difficult for minorities
to get the courts to decide in their favor.
Something seemingly nefarious was ensuing in New York City.
Over half of the city's population was minority, yet, when the lawsuit
commenced, only 3.4 percent and 6.7 percent of the city's fire fighters
were Black or Hispanic, respectively.37 The New York Fire Department
(FDNY) maintains a multi-tiered hiring process. The first tier, a written
examination, was used as a pass/fail screening device.7 Candidates also
had to pass a physical performance test. The written examination and
the performance test scores were combined with bonus points and placed
on a hierarchical hiring list.37'" The Vulcan Society contended that the
written test and the rank-ordering procedures violated the Equal Protec-
tion Clause.7
Surprisingly, lacking direct evidence, Judge Garaufis found that the
city had intentionally discriminated against Black firefighters.' Judge
Garaufis began his discussion of intentional discrimination thusly: "The
history of the City's efforts to remedy its discriminatory firefighter hiring
polices can be summarized as follows: 34 years of intransigence and delib-
erate indifference, bookended by identical judicial declarations that the
City's hiring policies are illegal.'3 Discrimination within the FDNY first
received judicial attention in 1973.38 That year, Judge Weinfeld held that
the City's practice of implementing non-validated written tests to screen
371. The Justice Department, well aware of the difficulty of proving intentional dis-
crimination, only brought Tide VII claims. See City of New York, 683 E Supp. 2d at 233.
372. The organization was first constituted in the 1940s amid discrimination in the
FDNY. See GARY R. URBANOWICZ, BADGES OF THE BRAVEST: A PICTORIAL HISTORY OF FIRE
DEPARTMENTS IN NEWYORK CITY 178-79 (2002).
373. See City of New York, 683 F Supp. 2d at 234.
374. See United States v. City of New York, 637 F Supp. 2d 77, 132 (E.D.N.Y 2009)
(granting the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on their claim that the city had
violated Title VII).
375. Id. "In other words, on a force of 8,998 firefighters, there were just 303 Black
firefighters and 605 Hispanic firefighters." Id. at 80.
376. City of NewYork, 683 E Supp. 2d at 233.
377. Id.
378. Id.
379. Id. at 234.
380. Id. at 264.
381. Id. at 262.
382. Id.
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and sort firefighter candidates violated antidiscrimination law because it
had adverse effects on Black applicants and lacked a legitimate business
necessity that may have overridden such effects." Twenty-six years later
in 2009, a federal court held that similar hiring procedures were illegal.
From 1973 to 2009 the number of Black firefighters hovered near 3 per-
cent of the total force.
New York City, however, contended that its troubling history was in-
consequential because the only issue was whether the interveners had
proven that decisionmakers purposefully harmed minority applicants.
City officials insisted that their behavior was "at worst a display of bureau-
cratic failure .... NewYork, in other words, believed this case mirrored
Feeney where the Supreme Court found that a veteran's preference, though
women were vastly less likely to be veterans, was not unconstitutional ab-
sent evidence that the policy was put in place purposefully with anti-female
388intentions.
The court, however, distinguished this case from Feeney, noting that
the policies in question had been criticized for thirty years and had a his-
tory of being declared illegal.3 89 In Feeney, the court wrote, the veterans'
preference had always been deemed a legitimate exercise. 390 However,
FDNY hiring practices had long been deemed illegal under the 1964
Civil Rights Act.39 1 "The difference,"Judge Garaufis wrote, "between pro-
ceeding with knowledge that an action will produce certain consequences
and proceeding with knowledge that an action is illegal is one of kind,
not degree."3 9 2 "The fact that the City . . . was on notice that exam prac-
tices with unjustified adverse effects on [B]lack applicants were
presumptively illegal, and nonetheless continued to enforce such policies,
is, at the very least, powerful evidence supporting an inference of inten-
tional discrimination."'393 To Judge Garaufis, city officials possessed an
"attitude of deliberate indifference" because they were clearly uncon-
cerned about the discriminatory impact of the FDNY's hiring policies,
"rais[ing] a strong inference that intentional discrimination was the City's
'standing operating procedure: "19
383. Vulcan Soc'y of New York City Fire Dep't, Inc. v. Civil Serv. Conin'n, 360 F
Supp. 1265, 1277 (S.D.N.Y 1973).
384. City of New York, 683 F Supp. 2d at 262.
385. Id.
386. Id.
387. Id. at 263.
388. Id.
389. Id.
390. Id. 263-64.
391. Id. at 264.
392. Id.
393. Id.
394. Id. at 266.
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Judge Garaufis found intentional discrimination through the use of a
deliberate indifference standard that differs from both Professor Black's
and my variant. I will call his standard Historical Deliberate Indifference.
Discriminatory intent was found by establishing that New York City offi-
cials had been on notice that their behavior was illegal for decades, yet the
officials opted for the very same policies anyway. The court used a proxy
to find intentional discrimination. In this way, the decision is somewhat
comparable to Norris v. Alabama. 5 Remember in Norris the Supreme
Court held that prolonged absence of Blacks from juries established a pri-
mafacie case of intentional discrimination.3 9 6 In United States v. City of New
York, the court deemed that continued use of previously declared illegal
hiring practices established intentional discrimination under Title VII.3 9 7
While Norris was helpful in many other cases, City of New York, how-
ever, would unlikely mirror that success. The Supreme Court, relying on
Norris, overturned many convictions that were secured through discrimi-
nation in the composition of juries... Unfortunately, Historical Deliberate
Indifference fails to show that sort of promise. Indeed, there are not many
racial minorities who can cite to a case invalidating a law or governmental
policy that is still maintained by the state. Historical Deliberate Indiffer-
ence, however, shares Norris's biggest defect. Many Blacks for years had to
have been denied a jury from which their race could ever serve before
Norris could ever be activated. The same problem exists for Historical De-
liberate Indifference as seen in United States v. City of New York; the case's
holding was premised on Blacks for decades being denied an opportunity
to serve as firemen in New York City. Thus, as in Norris, the success of
winning a lawsuit is built on years of misery for people of color.
More importantly, Historical Deliberate Indifference would not lead
to an equal protection violation in Floyd. The judiciary has no history of
slapping down New York's stop and frisk policies for being discriminatory.
A court relying on this standard, consequently, would have nothing on
which to hang an equal protection deprivation. Historical Deliberate In-
difference, to be sure, is an improvement over the Intent Doctrine. But it
is far from perfect. A panacea it is not.
Having determined that each of these solutions is flawed, this Article
now turns to an analysis of the comparative strengths and weaknesses of
PBDI.
395. See 294 U.S. 587 (1935).
396. Id. at 591-92.
397. City of New York, 683 E Supp. 2d at 264.
398. Starkey, Criminal Procedure, supra note * at 30-46.
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IV. NEw SOLUTION: PLAINTIFF-BURDENED DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE
This section advances the Plaintiff-Burdened Deliberate Indifference
standard. Analyzing all four of its prongs, this section demonstrates exactly
how a claimant can prove an equal protection violation under this new
test. This section concludes by exposing this test to among the strongest
criticisms it must survive. It finally concludes that PBDI is sturdy enough
to withstand scrutiny.
A. Unraveling Plaintif-Burdened Deliberate Indiference
Under PBDI, the plaintiff carries the burden of proving that (1) the
plaintiff alerted the state to the existence of a law, policy, or manner of
conducting business that constrains races unequally; (2) the plaintiff pro-
vided the governmental body with an alternative law, policy, or manner of
conducting business that is likely to greatly diminish or solve the com-
plained of racial disparities; and (3) the government failed to act. After
these three prongs are proven, (4) the government carries the burden of
proving that its failure to act furthered a compelling governmental inter-
est. If the government fails to produce a compelling governmental
interest, equal protection has been denied.
As noted previously, the Intent Doctrine remains intact. Claimants
have two different options to pursue an equal protection violation: intent
and PBDI. One might wonder why intent still endures.The answer is that
keeping intent solves the problem that Professor Derek Black has encoun-
tered. If one actually has the proof to evidence intentional discrimination,
it would be unreasonable to force them to prove their case under PBDI.
The first prong is relatively straightforward. Claimants cannot argue
that the state should have been aware of any racially disparate impacts that
its behavior has caused. Rather, a claimant must affirmatively alert the
state to any uneven impact. One might wonder how exactly does one
alert the state, and which person(s) must be alerted? The best way for po-
tential plaintiffs to meet their burden is to have an attorney deliver
something similar to an official complaint to the person(s) who would be
listed as the defendants in a potential lawsuit. On this prong, Professor
Derek Black and I disagree. Under his test, a state can be liable even if it
did not know that disparate impacts were occurring as long as the state
should have known.
Under the second prong, after alerting the state to the complained
of disparate impact, a claimant carries the burden of proffering an alter-
nate policy that is likely to mitigate or solve the complained of disparate
impact. As with the first prong, a wise plaintiff will have his attorney de-
liver the alternate plan to persons who would be named in the potential
lawsuit. Again, Professor Black and I differ here; his test requires that the
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alternatives merely be available while I require the plaintiff to have offered
up a replacement that is likely to fix the problem.
It is worth examining how onerous of a burden the plaintiff will
carry here. On one end of the spectrum, one might presume that this
prong requires that the plaintiff have a substitute policy that has been
proven to work because it has been instituted successfully elsewhere. On
the other end of the spectrum, one might conclude that the hurdle for
the plaintiff is low since he only has to present the state with any idea that
may or may not work. The answer is somewhere in the middle. This
prong requires a fully-formed substitute, but it does not have to be a
proven one in the sense that the policy or law has been put in place else-
where and has a documented history establishing its success. Instead, there
must be enough supportive corroboration that makes the policy a likely
success in terms of meeting the state's overall objectives and reducing the
complained of racial disparities.
As for the third prong, the plaintiff still carries the burden.This time,
however, the burden is light. The plaintiff merely has to prove that the
state did nothing after it was presented with the substitute policy. The
state would not be required to adopt the suggested alternative policy, but
it must move to correct the disparate impacts. An issue here is how much
time the state would have to correct its disparate impacts. It would be
unwise to have a hard set time requirement because situations vary, and it
should be left to the courts to determine whether the state has had
enough time in which to implement a new plan.
After the first three prongs have been met, the burden shifts to the
state. Here the state will lose an equal protection dispute unless it can
produce a compelling reason for not moving to cure the disparate impact.
If no compelling reason exists, then equal protection has been denied.
This last prong permits the state to offer affirmatively what other consid-
erations at play may rightly lead it to continue to pursue its course of
action. Though the burden here is high, I do not envision that if the
plaintiff satisfies the first three prongs the court's duties are all but over.
Plaintiff-Burdened Deliberate Indifference was devised specifically
to counteract hard-to-prove discriminatory motives, unconscious bias and
structural racism. In offering a solution to the Intent Doctrine, one must
take disparate impact off the table because the Court has held consistently
that the standard is inapplicable. A disparate impact standard that makes
strict scrutiny apply whenever races are burdened unevenly would re-
spond to these three issues, but the Supreme Court has rejected it. Thus,
those seeking to forge new ground for the Equal Protection Clause
should devise a new solution as this Article does.
The key in combating those three issues is that directly confronting
them is futile. Indeed, a test that relies on proving unconscious bias, for
instance, will be inherently messy. One must, then, devise a creative way of
addressing these problems. I believe that Plaintiff-Burdened Deliberate
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Indifference is that creative solution. If a state has been told that its behav-
ior produces racially uneven impacts, and has been provided an alternate
policy that promises to be just as effective but without the uneven impacts
(or reduced disparate impacts), and the state continues as is, then, that
should be considered a form of discrimination.
Plaintiff-Burdened Deliberate Indifference is premised on this cen-
tral question: After being alerted that its policy is causing racial harms, and
given a promising policy that reduces or solves those racial harms, why
would a government choose to ignore the new policy and continue with
one that discriminates? What's worse? A state that consciously discrimi-
nates or a state that, when told it is discriminating, is offered a way to not
discriminate, but chooses the discriminatory path anyway? The objective
of PBDI is simple: to provide states an option to not discriminate. States
can always deny that intentional discrimination is afoot and unconscious
bias is hard to prove. But PBDI brings the debate to a conscious level. In-
deed, a state that fails PBDI has consciously chosen to discriminate when a
nondiscriminatory option was available There is no legally relevant dif-
ference between choosing a discriminatory policy over a nondiscriminatory
one and intent to discriminate.
B. Possible Criticisms
Perhaps the most compelling criticism that PBDI might encounter
is that it places too heavy of a burden on plaintiffs, particularly since the
cost of funding an equal protection challenge is expensive. But more than
merely being expensive, this criticism holds that plaintiffs should not have
to alert the state to the existence of a discriminatory impact, and more
importantly, plaintiffs must not be forced to provide a substitute policy.
Those who level this critique might contend that plaintiffs are ill-suited
to devise policy solutions. This argument, in sum, is that the Intent Doc-
trine is an impossible burden and PBDI is an impossibly onerous one.
As an initial matter, even if plaintiffs were forced to carry a heavy
burden, at least this standard allows them an opportunity to directly con-
front equal protection denials. But, those who support this critique need
to consider this more deeply. If the Supreme Court were to embrace this
test, what would be the consequence of the Equal Protection Clause sud-
denly becoming relevant again for racial minorities? The likely answer is
that racial justice and civil rights organizations around the country, in re-
sponse, would devise solutions to the various problems that plague racial
minorities most. Minorities, in reality, will not be forced to develop policy
solutions. After alerting the state to the existence of racially disparate
399. For instance, in Title VIII cases, if other nondiscriminatory options are available,
courts will view that as supporting a claim that illegal behavior had occurred. See, e.g.,
Huntington Branch, NAACP v.Town of Huntington, 844 F2d 926,939 (1988).
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impacts, the burden for plaintiffs might be as light as going to a website
and downloading a well-conceived plan.
Some might contend that the non-profit organizations that bring
these sorts of lawsuits will not have the money to devise the required
policy solutions. But such criticism misses the mark. These organizations
regularly bring these lawsuits and, more importantly, the policy solutions
that they are likely to rely on are the sorts of projects that public policy
professionals do in the course of their work. Plaintiff's shoulders, simply
put, are unlikely to collapse under the burden as critics may insist.
A deeper examination of PBDI might reveal that its implementation
might result in the courts being inundated with equal protection lawsuits,
overwhelming the judiciary. This criticism, though, may not have much
merit because fewer lawsuits might be brought than some may expect. If
governments realize that they cannot choose a discriminatory path if it
has been offered a nondiscriminatory route, then governments will quick-
ly appreciate that and may work cooperatively with citizens to ensure that
discrimination does not pervade in society. If not, they theoretically ex-
pose themselves to potentially expensive § 1983 lawsuits.
But some governments may be undaunted by a potential lawsuit and
choose to harbor disparate impacts for which there are remedies, leading
to an influx of lawsuits. That should not, however, be seen as a problem
with PBDI. Instead, that merely hints that society harbored discrimination
for which there was no remedy. There can be too much discrimination;
there cannot be too many lawsuits that are brought in response to actual
discrimination. We should never "fear too much justice" in the words of
Justice Brennan in his McCleskey dissent.4
The last criticism is the argument that there should never be a com-
pelling reason to continue an existing policy if the state has been given a
nondiscriminatory option. Many are likely sympathetic to this argument.
It is difficult to envision many compelling reasons to choose a discrimina-
tory path when the state has been given a nondiscriminatory option. But
it is imperative that the state be extended the opportunity to have its
voice heard. The state, perhaps, has considerations of which courts should
take stock.
V. APPLICATION
This final Part argues that PBDI would lead to an equal protection
violation in Floyd v. City of New York. By forcing police departments to
ensure that minorities are not being denied their Fourth Amendment
rights because of race, PBDI gives the Equal Protection Clause back its
bite. This section will trace how PBDI would produce an equal protection
400. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 339 (1987) (Brennan,J., dissenting).
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victory by detailing, step-by-step, the manner by which the class action
plaintiffs in Floyd would have to prove their case.
A. Alerting the State
The first prong for PBDI is to alert the state and as mentioned this
is a light burden to carry. The class action plaintiffs in Floyd merely need
to notify city officials that there are racial disparities when it comes to
NYPD's stop-and-frisk practices. Providing the city with its own statistical
data establishing that Black and Brown New Yorkers are disproportionate-
ly stopped and frisked would satisfy this prong.
B. Presenting New York City with an Alternate Policy
The hardest part for the class-action plaintiffs in Floyd would be of-
fering a substitute policy that is likely to reduce or cure the racial
disparities yet still permit the NYPD to effectively police the streets. At
the outset, it is important to note that NewYork's stop and frisk tactics are
less successful than random checkpoints.The bar, therefore, is set very low.
Here are some possible solutions.401
1. Officer Tracking
University of South Carolina Criminology Professor Geoffrey P.
Alpert believes that racial profiling "is not an efficient, an effective, or a
responsible police strategy.40 2 Professor Alpert, therefore, presses for police
departments to track officers' behavior and compare findings to similarly
situated fellow officers. 40 3 Such a police strategy to combat officers using
race as a proxy for reasonable suspicion would "use peer comparisons to
determine appropriate behavioral patterns."4 To understand what this
policy entails, Professor Alpert's words are worth quoting at length.
401. There are two solutions I did not include because they appear to be too general.
See John D. Cohen,Janet Lennon & Robert Wasserman, Eliminating Racial Profiling, availa-
ble at http://www.dlc.org/print.cfin?contentid=610; POLICE EXECUTIVE RESEARCH FORUM,
RACIALLY BIASED POLICING: A PRINCIPLED RESPONSE 49-63 (2001); see also Brandon Gar-
rett, Remedying Racial Profiling, 33 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REV. 41 (2001) (discussing various
options to remedy racial profiling).Another idea that I do not discuss at length is a contro-
versial plan that advocates randomization in police investigations. See generally BERNARD E.
HARCOURT, AGAINST PREDICTION: PUNISHING AND POLICING IN AN ACTUARIAL AGE (2007).
402. Geoffrey P. Alpert, Eliminate Race as the Only Reason for Police-Citizen Encounters,
6 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. Por'y 671,676 (2007).
403. Id. at 672.
404. Id. at 675.
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Specifically, police departments should institute a policy that
maintains and evaluates statistics on each police officer's ac-
tions, including vehicular and pedestrian stops, and post-stop
activities. The agencies should incorporate internal bench-
marking to compare the behavior and activities of similarly
situated officers in the same department (officers who are as-
signed during the same time and same location).This method
can be used to compare stops, citations, searches, arrests, and
other activities, and it can be included as part of a more
comprehensive management procedure such as an "early in-
405tervention" or early warning system.
Though "internal benchmarking" lacks the capacity to assess wheth-
er the overall behavior of a police force meets normative conceptions of
reasonable suspicion, what it can do is locate officers whose conduct dif-
406fers from the mean. From there, police departments can implement
1 07intervention techniques.
Police departments who adopt this policy must have an accountability
system that has three components.40s First, police departments will have to
define who is an outlier officer (i.e., which officers will be targeted for in-
tervention). 409 "Second, the [department] must determine how to undertake
the intervention and decide whether informal or formal counseling or
training is warranted." 410 And third, there must be "post-intervention mom-
toring" to assess whether the officer's behavior is improving.4 11
2. Center for Constitutional Rights' Recommendations
The Center for Constitutional Rights (CCR) has offered a few rec-
ommendations to negate racial disparities in Terry stops.4 2  One
recommendation in CCR's 2008 preliminary report is that the NYPD
must release additional policing and crime data. t The report contends
that "[g]reater transparency about NYPD policies and procedures is essen-
tial in combating the racial profiling of hundreds of New Yorkers."4 14 The
405. Id.
406. See id.
407. Id. at 675-76.
408. Id.
409. Id.
410. Id.
411. Id.
412. See generally CENTER FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, RACIAL DISPARITIES IN
NYPD STOPS-AND-FRISKS (2009) available at http://ccrjustice.org/files/Report-CCR-
NYPD-Stop-and-Frisk.pdf.
413. Id. at 16.
414. Id.
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NYPD, furthermore, has inconsistently reported the numbers of stops and
frisks, to the chagrin of many. 1 CCR, therefore, wants to oblige the city
to adhere to reporting regulations that require that the NYPD "to report
to the City Council quarterly on the number of stop-and-frisks in every
precinct by race and gender."'416 The last CCR recommendation is to ex-
pand the Civilian Complaint Review Board's power.1 Ideally, CCR
wants an "increased authority to impose more effective disciplinary sanc-
tions based on the findings of their investigation, independent of any
input or influence by the NYPD."418 This last recommendation is particu-
larly persuasive.
A necessary component of any alternate policy must include im-
proved training of officers on reasonable suspicion and instruction on
unconscious bias. The police department alleged that it teaches its officers
during a training program the proper way to conduct stop and frisks and
warns against racial profiling." 9 But Judge Scheindlin, the presiding judge
in Floyd, criticized those efforts, "noting that numerous officers did not
recall ever receiving such training."420 The NYPD must effectively train
police officers to conduct valid Terry stops and about the perils of uncon-
scious bias.
3. Anti-Racial Profiling Laws
Another facet of an alternate policy might include the enacting of
anti-racial profiling laws. In 2001, Cincinnati, for example, passed such an
ordinance. Such laws are an excellent way of deterring police misbehavior
by making such improprieties criminal. "When an officer's intention is to
violate the constitutional rights of citizens, criminal penalties are justi-
fied. 421
4. Quota System
One last possible solution is placing a quota on the number of peo-
ple New York officers can stop and frisk during a given year. As
mentioned, the NYPD stopped and frisked over 680,000 persons in 2011
though only 6 percent were ultimately arrested. Those low arrest statistics
unveil that New York officers have an untenable standard for reasonable
415. See id.
416. Id.
417. Id. at 16-17.
418. Id. at 17.
419. Editorial, supra note 39, at A20.
420. Id.
421. Floyd Weatherspoon, Ending Racial Profilitg of African-Americans in the Selective
Etnforcement of Laws: In Search of Viable Remedies, 65 U. PITT. L. REv 721, 739 (2004).
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suspicion. If New York could only stop and frisk a third of that amount,
police officers might feel forced to actually stop only those for whom
there is a reasonable suspicion that crime is afoot.422
C. Failure to Act
Here, the plaintiffs have to prove that NYC failed to act. For the
purposes of this Article, I will assume that the city ignored any calls for it
to amend its stop and frisk policies.The burden here, therefore, is light.
D. Compelling Reasons Not to Act
Because the minority class-action plaintiffs carried their burden, the
burden then shifts to New York City to proffer a compelling reason for
not attempting to remedy their discrimination. Here, the city's best argu-
ment would undoubtedly be that the stop and frisks rates reflect the
crime statistics in the city. Blacks and Hispanics, in other words, comnit a
disproportionate amount of crime and thus are stopped at higher rates.
This would be a compelling reason not to act if there were not studies
proving that the higher crime rates of Blacks and Hispanics do not entire-
ly explain those groups being stopped and frisked at alarmingly high rates.
New York also might contend that "stop and frisk" is crucial to en-
suring safe streets. But this argument rings hollow, particularly since
random checkpoints are more likely to lead to an arrest than Terry stops. If
random police work is more fortuitous than cops actually observing be-
havior, then it's fair to conclude that New York City would avert
descending back to 1980s-level of violence if its policies were modified to
ensure that Black and Brown New Yorkers do not have their constitution-
al rights violated.
In conclusion, I fail to locate any compelling reason that would ex-
cuse New York City for failing to move to correct its discriminatory stop
and frisk techniques. Thus, under PBDI, the Floyd plaintiffs would prevail
422. Randall Kennedy espouses what may seem to be an opposite version of this
idea. Kennedy writes:
[I]nstead of placing a racial tax on [B]lacks, Mexican-Americans, and other
colored people, governments should, if necessary, increase taxes across the
board. More specifically, rather than authorizing police to count Mexican
ancestry or apparent [B]lackness as negative proxies, states and the federal
government should be forced either to hire more officers or to inconven-
ience everyone at checkpoints by subjecting all motorists and passengers to
questioning (or to the same chance of random questioning).
RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW 159-61 (1997). By taxes, Kennedy is
referring to a racial tax, in other words, a price that racial minorities have to pay for being
a racial minority. Id.
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in an equal protection lawsuit, illustrating how potentially transformation-
al this new standard is to antidiscrimination law. Another revolutionary
aspect of PBDI is that if New York City officials realize that they have no
compelling reason to continue a discriminatory policy, they might move
to repair the city's policing techniques on their own.
In the Introduction, this Article argues that the Supreme Court had
effectively stricken through the Equal Protection Clause in the Constitu-
tion for racial minorities. The Equal Protection Clause, however, can be
resurrected. Indeed, Plaintiff-Burdened Deliberate Indifference can give
the Equal Protection Clause the life that the Supreme Court has practi-
cally extinguished. That the Equal Protection Clause could force police
departments to cease racial profiling would be a revolutionary change for
people of color, and potentially women and members of the LGBT
community as well in other contexts. That change is sorely needed.
CONCLUSION
Racial minorities endeavoring to prove an asserted denial of equal
protection must establish that a state actor intended to cause a discrimina-
tory result. Intent is an exceedingly onerous burden. Claimants, moreover,
cannot argue that unconscious bias is the reason for an asserted equal pro-
tection deprivation. Does America, then, truly offer its citizens equal
protection under the law? If our understanding of equal protection does
not respond to the difficulties of proving intent and the salience of im-
plicit bias can we truly claim to offer our citizens equal protection of the
laws? This Article insists we cannot. Plaintiff-Burdened Deliberate Indif-
ference is the solution to the problem. By requiring that the state opts for
the nondiscriminatory path when presented with one, PBDI, unlike the
Intent Doctrine, gives true power to the words "no state shall ... deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."4 23
U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV.
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